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ENVIRONMENTAL PRIVACY
Katrina Fischer Kuh *
I. INTRODUCTION
Policymakers and scholars recognize that individuals are an important source
of environmental harm. 1 Individuals’ decisions and actions—running a washing
machine, driving to work, or purchasing a pair of blue jeans 2—impose direct and
*
© 2015 Katrina Fischer Kuh. Professor of Law, Maurice A. Deane School of Law at
Hofstra University. I am indebted to the Wallace Stegner Center at the University of Utah
S.J. Quinney College of Law for providing me with the opportunity to present this paper as
the 2013 Young Scholar Lecture. The project was also supported by a generous research
grant funded by the Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University and by the hard
work of research assistants Sarah Heba, Adam Preller, and Frank Piccininni.
1
See, e.g., JASON J. CZARNEZKI, EVERYDAY ENVIRONMENTALISM: LAW NATURE &
INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR 142–43 (2011) (detailing the environmental impacts of everyday
behaviors); RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 183–96 (2008) (observing that “[i]n the United
States, national emissions limitations imposed on major pollution sources have been the rule,
not the exception”; criticizing this command-and-control regime; and suggesting strategies
for achieving voluntary changes in individual behavior, for example, by providing feedback
and information); Nathan Ostrander, Consumer Liability for Harms Linked to Purchases, 2
ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 111, 121–23 (2011) (proposing a consumption tort to hold
individuals accountable for environmental harms); James Salzman, Sustainable
Consumption and the Law, 27 ENVTL. L. 1243, 1250, 1255–56 (1997) (explaining the
connection between consumption and environmental harm); Michael P. Vandenbergh, From
Smokestack to SUV: The Individual as Regulated Entity in the New Era of Environmental
Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 515, 537–84 (2004) [hereinafter Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to
SUV] (identifying types of “individual environmentally significant behavior”); Michael P.
Vandenbergh et al., Implementing the Behavioral Wedge: Designing and Adopting Effective
Carbon Emissions Reduction Programs, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 10547, 10551–52 (2010)
[hereinafter Vandenbergh et al., Implementing the Behavioral Wedge] (making
recommendations to policymakers about how best to achieve reductions in harms from
environmentally significant individual behaviors); Michael P. Vandenbergh, et al.,
Individual Carbon Emissions: The Low-Hanging Fruit, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1716–51
(2008) [hereinafter Vandenbergh et al., Individual Carbon Emissions] (identifying individual
greenhouse gas-emitting behaviors most susceptible to change and suggesting strategies for
changing them); Michael P. Vandenbergh & Anne C. Steinemann, The Carbon-Neutral
Individual, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1673, 1724 (2007) [hereinafter Vandenbergh & Steinemann,
The Carbon-Neutral Individual] (suggesting that “a mixture of information provision and
traditional regulatory measures may be needed” to “reduce carbon-emitting behaviors”).
2
AGENCE DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT ET DE LA MAÎTRISE DE L'ENERGIE, AN
ENVIRONMENTAL PRODUCT DECLARATION OF JEANS, available at http://www.ademe.fr/
internet/eco-jean/EPD_en_jeans_v2.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/89K6-K7LS (last
visited Sept. 3, 2014) (providing a life cycle analysis of the environmental impact of
purchasing and wearing blue jeans, including both indirect impacts embedded in the
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indirect impacts on the environment that, while often individually de minimis,
collectively impose significant harms. 3 Environmental statutes, however, rarely
target these environmentally significant individual behaviors; regulatory attention
focuses primarily on industrial sources of environmental harm. 4 And public
ignorance of the connection between lifestyle and environment is pervasive—there
is “a cognitive severance of environmental cause and effect” 5 that permits
individuals to “participate in environmental degradations of monumental
proportions in a completely anonymous and unconscious fashion.” 6
In the context of climate change, for example, greenhouse gas emissions
attributable to the direct emissions of individuals or households are estimated to
account for approximately 30% of total U.S. emissions. 7 Notably, this estimate
counts only direct emissions and thus captures primarily greenhouse gas emissions
generated by private transportation and home energy use. 8 Estimates of greenhouse
gas emissions attributable to individuals are far greater when indirect emissions are
included. Indirect emissions might result from the preparation (production and
delivery) of a product or service before its use (such as the emissions generated
during the manufacture and delivery of a car). One study that adopted a consumer
lifestyle approach designed to capture both direct and indirect emissions concluded
that consumer lifestyle decisions account for 85% of all energy use in the United
States and that consumer consumption activities account for 102% of U.S.
emissions. 9 Although reductions in consumer energy demand offer an efficient
approach for reducing a significant volume of greenhouse gas emissions, 10 core
regulatory approaches are directed upstream to manufacturers and energy producers
manufacturing process of jeans and direct impacts occasioned by consumers’ washing and
disposal of the jeans).
3
Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV, supra note 1, at 541–84 (charting the direct
contributions of individuals to various environmental harms).
4
Id. at 517 (“With few exceptions, the environmental laws enacted since the 1970s
have directed command and control requirements at large industrial sources of pollution.”).
5
RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 213 (2004); see also
CZARNEZKI, supra note 1, at 142 (“It has become more difficult to appreciate the ecological
consequences of our daily activities as modern society becomes further removed from our
sources of food and energy, and from the natural resources that serve as raw materials.”).
6
Betsy Taylor & Dave Tilford, Why Consumption Matters, in THE CONSUMER SOCIETY
READER 475, 482 (Juliet B. Schor & Doublas B. Holt eds., 2000); see also Victor B. Flatt,
Too Big to Jail or Too Abstract (or Rich?) to Care, 72 MD. L. REV. 1345, 1347 (2013)
(“[T]he impacts of environmental harm have come to seem less immediate and threatening,
and therefore are seen as less of a threat to the social order.”).
7
Vandenbergh et al., Implementing the Behavioral Wedge, supra note 1, at 10549.
8
Id.
9
Shui Bin & Hadi Dowlatabadi, Consumer Lifestyle Approach to U.S. Energy Use and
the Related CO2 Emissions, 33 ENERGY POL’Y 197, 203–05 (2005) (explaining that the fact
that the total exceeds 100% reflects emissions embodied in imported goods).
10
Vandenbergh et al., Individual Carbon Emissions, supra note 1, at 1703 (“[T]he
individual and household sector represents an enormous and largely untapped source of
prompt, low-cost emissions reductions.”).
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and rely primarily on measures that would reduce demand indirectly, as by raising
the cost of energy or mandating product efficiency. 11 Proposals that raise consumer
energy costs struggle to find political support; product efficiency mandates are
vulnerable to overall increases in demand resulting from consumer behaviors,
including the rebound effect (increases in product use when the produce becomes
more energy efficient and therefore less expensive to operate) or junker effects
(increases in the duration of the use of older, more inefficient products when energy
efficiency requirements cause new replacement products to become more
expensive). 12
Reorienting law and policy to more directly address and limit the harms arising
from environmentally significant individual behaviors could thus yield significant
benefits. Doing so will, however, require new regulatory approaches and better
information about environmentally significant behaviors.13 I have previously
explained in some detail how modalities for regulating environmentally significant
behavior require information about that behavior and so I will not repeat that analysis
here, 14 but the need for information to support regulation is readily apparent. Before
we can deploy norm management to encourage voluntary behavior change by
educating individuals about the environmental harms occasioned by their behavior,
we must understand those behaviors and their environmental effects, as well as
communicate them to individuals. 15 Before we can use a market approach to charge
individuals for consumption of a public environmental good, we must be able to
discern and track how individuals consume that good. 16 To effectively impose a
mandate prohibiting behavior, we must have some means to identify violations and
11

John C. Dernbach, Harnessing Individual Behavior to Address Climate Change:
Options for Congress, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 107, 108 (2008) (lamenting that “the
comprehensive bills currently before Congress focus primarily on large emitting entities”;
exhorting Congress to “also actively engage individuals in the implementation of any climate
change legislation”; and explaining that “[t]he need for individual citizen involvement is
necessary for a variety of reasons, including the importance of ensuring proper
implementation, the need to reduce GHG emissions as rapidly as possible, and the significant
contribution that individuals make to GHG emissions”).
12
Robert R. Nordhaus & Kyle W. Danish, Assessing the Options for Designing a
Mandatory U.S. Greenhouse Gas Reduction Program, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 97, 119,
148–49, 157 (2005).
13
Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Economics, Consumption, and Environmental
Protection, in HANDBOOK ON RESEARCH IN SUSTAINABLE CONSUMPTION (Lucia Reisch &
John Thøgersen eds.) (forthcoming) (manuscript at 4) (on file with Utah Law Review)
(advocating the use of choice architecture and libertarian paternalism to achieve
environmental benefits by shaping consumer behavior while preserving choice in a way that
“expands the policy toolbox”).
14
Katrina Fischer Kuh, Personal Environmental Information: The Promise and Perils
of the Emerging Capacity to Identify Individual Environmental Harms, 65 VAND. L. REV.
1565, 1575–95 (2012).
15
Vandenbergh & Steinemann, The Carbon Neutral Individual, supra note 1, at 1707
(describing how information can aid norm development).
16
Kuh, supra note 14, at 1585–91.
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enforce the mandate. 17 More generally, better information about environmentally
significant individual behaviors and their impacts may be crucial for generating the
personal and political will to support the adoption and implementation of policies
directed to those behaviors. 18
The capacity for developing information about environmentally significant
individual behaviors and deploying that information in support of regulation has
grown rapidly with advances in technology. 19 Remote sensing, for example, is being
deployed in support of environmental regulation in a number of contexts. 20 The
17

Id. at 1593–95; see also Felicity Barringer, With Data and Resolve, Tacoma Fights
Pollution, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2014, at A17 (describing the use of advanced monitoring
techniques to identify and track storm water discharges). In Tacoma, the “forensic work of
the scientists and the city changed the ability to enforce antipollution laws.” Barringer, supra,
at A17. Dr. Joel Baker, science director of the Center for Urban Waters in Tacoma, “talk[s]
about being able to go to anyone—an individual, a house, a business—who is discharging
something . . . and unambiguously trace back to them. That gets you into a whole different
conversation with people about responsibilities and remedies.” Id.
18
Flatt, supra note 6, at 1371 (“Without a will, there is no way, and no funding, focus,
or public pressure to stem this tide . . . [W]e should try and help people understand that
environmental harms are more immediate to spur them into supporting stronger
environmental policies and enforcement for themselves and for others.”); Mark S. McCaffrey
& Susan M. Buhr, Toward a Climate-Literate Society, [2008] 38 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law
Inst.) 10838, 10838 (describing a study showing that knowledge about the causes of climate
change often correlates with a stated intention to support mitigation policies); Paul C. Stern
et al., A Value-Belief-Norm Theory of Support for Social Movements: The Case of
Environmentalism, 6 HUM. ECOLOGY REV. 81, 83–84 (1999) (discussing the Value-BeliefNorm theory with respect to civic behaviors).
19
Kuh, supra note 14, at 1566–67; Gregg P. Macey, The Architecture of Ignorance,
2013 UTAH L. REV. 1627, 1638 (describing how technology has greatly increased the
availability of environmental data and observing that “[t]he scale of data available, the
practice of translating them into usable knowledge, and the participants in those efforts are
each experiencing qualitative shifts. . . . Agencies must grapple with a paradigmatic change
in how policy-relevant knowledge is produced, as well as with the demand for new regulatory
practices that it will bring.”).
20
See OFFICE OF RESEARCH & DEV., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REMOTE SENSING
PROGRAM FOR EPA FY 2006 PROGRAM SUMMARY 1–2 (2007) (summarizing the use of
remote sensing to support EPA programs); William Boyd, Ways of Seeing Environmental
Law: How Deforestation Became an Object of Climate Governance, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 843,
884–91 (2010) (describing the use of remote sensing technology in the management of
forests and land use); see also Macey, supra note 19, at 1666–67 (describing how remote
sensing and other technologies will enable “data-intensive regulation” and observing that
“[a]cross geographies, data are gathered at new scales and in near real time, through nimble
networks in which members of the public can serve as nodes”). See generally Erin J. Coburn,
Protecting Our Environment in a Virtual Age: How Wildlife Webcams Could Strengthen
Enforcement of the Endangered Species Act, [2013] 43 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.)
11021 (arguing that an individual that views species via wildlife webcam should be
recognized as having standing under the Endangered Species Act); Nicole Giffin, Note,
Privacy Issues Surrounding the Tracking and Sharing of Boat Movement Information as Part
of Invasive Species Prevention Programs, 3 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 141 (2013)
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“smart city” provides perhaps the best example of using technology, including
remote sensing, to generate information about and shape environmentally significant
individual behaviors. A smart city is a “place[] where information technology is
combined with infrastructure, architecture, everyday objects, and even our bodies to
address social, economic, and environmental problems.” 21 Songdo, South Korea, a
newly constructed smart city, is described as follows:
Songdo is the world’s largest experiment in urban automation, with
millions of sensors deployed in its roads, electrical grids, water and waste
systems to precisely track, respond to, and even predict the flow of people
and material. . . . Plans call for cameras that detect the presence of
pedestrians at night in order to save energy safely by automatically
extinguishing street lighting on empty blocks. Passing automobiles with
RFID-equipped license plates will be scanned . . . to create a real-time
map of vehicle movements and, over time, the ability to predict future
traffic patterns based on the trove of past measurements. A smart
electricity grid will communicate with home appliances, perhaps
anticipating the evening drawdown of juice as tens of thousands of
programmable rice cookers count down to dinnertime. 22
A basic premise of smart cities is that technology will track and store data about
resident behavior that can be used by the city to manage those behaviors for a variety
of beneficial purposes, including reducing energy demand and achieving other
environmental objectives. 23 Finally, this new data may help to “objectify[] . . . and
fram[e]” the challenge of limiting environmental harms arising from
environmentally significant individual behaviors, “thereby shaping the possibilities
for particular legal and policy responses.” 24 As one scholar has noted, “particular
scientific and technological knowledge practices make environmental problems into
coherent objects of governance” and “[s]uch knowledge practices, or ways of seeing,
are instrumental in shaping regulatory possibilities . . . .” 25
To summarize, individuals are increasingly recognized as an important source
of environmental harm that warrants greater policy attention; designing and
implementing effective policies will require information about environmentally
significant individual behaviors; and technology makes it feasible to develop such
information. Developing information about environmentally significant individual
(evaluating the use of electronic tracking of boats to prevent the spread of quagga and zebra
mussels).
21
ANTHONY M. TOWNSEND, SMART CITIES: BIG DATA, CIVIC HACKERS, AND THE
QUEST FOR A NEW UTOPIA 15 (2013).
22
Id. at 24 (citation omitted).
23
Id. at 29 (describing the use of data in Songdo, South Korea); id. at 38–42 (describing
the ecological benefits of the smart grid); id. at 205–12 (describing data-driven
management).
24
Boyd, supra note 20, at 898.
25
Id. at 843.
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behaviors can, however, occasion significant concerns about privacy. With respect
to smart cities, one author remarks: “The extent to which mass urban surveillance
will be tolerated in smart cities will differ around the world. Government, with
varying degrees of citizen input, will need to strike a balance between the costs of
intrusion and the benefits of early detection.” 26 Privacy concerns occasioned by the
installation of smart meters have caused some communities to vote to ban their
installation and have caused regulators to alter the way the technology is deployed. 27
Recently, false reports about the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) use of
drones to detect Clean Water Act (CWA) violations (which originated in complaints
about the EPA’s use of small aircraft for the same purpose) generated a voluble
outcry about government intrusion on privacy. 28 And scholars have flagged potential
constitutional limits, grounded in privacy, on the use of Geographic Information
Systems (GIS) technology and remote sensing in support of environmental
regulation. 29
In light of the growing regulatory and political imperative to identify,
understand, and address environmentally significant individual behaviors and the
emerging technical capacity for doing so, it will become increasingly necessary for
environmental policy to navigate privacy issues. This Article looks to nuisance
doctrine, surveillance under environmental statutes, and Fourth Amendment cases
arising in implementation of fish and game laws (the hunter enforcement cases) to
better understand our experience, to date, balancing the need for environmental
information with privacy. Section A analyzes common law nuisance and its
relationship to individual privacy concerns and concludes that the law affords little
26

TOWNSEND, supra note 21, at 274 (“Americans seem resigned to muddle through,
leaving the courts to settle conflicts over digital surveillance and privacy on a case-by-case
basis.”).
27
Kuh, supra note 14, at 1613–22.
28
David A. Fahrenthold, Reining in the Rumor About EPA ‘Drones,’ WASH. POST (June
18,
2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/reining-in-the-rumors-about-epadrones/2012/06/16/gJQAwWjkhV_story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/3R9-QKQD.
29
E.g., Peter M. Flannery, Note, How to Pry with Maps: The Fourth Amendment
Privacy Implications of Governmental Wetland Geographic Information Systems (GIS), 29
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 447, 472 (2003) (“Under the current law . . . a wetland
GIS is likely to infringe upon the Fourth Amendment privacy rights of homeowners in
several factual circumstances. In light of this circumstance, federal and state governments
should proceed with the utmost caution in planning and constructing such a project, or
perhaps reconsider it altogether.” (citation omitted)); Giffin, supra note 20, at 154 (arguing
that electronic tracking of boats could help to prevent the spread of quagga and zebra mussels
but concluding that “the implementation of a real-time regional tracking system is not
feasible for privacy, constitutional, and practical reasons” and endorsing alternate means of
mussel control); Kenneth J. Markowitz, Legal Challenges and Market Rewards to the Use
and Acceptance of Remote Sensing and Digital Information as Evidence, 12 DUKE ENVTL.
L. & POL’Y F. 219, 251–52 (2002) (providing an overview of remote sensing technologies
and their actual and potential use in environmental regulation and observing that “[t]he main
constitutional issues facing remote sensing data are allegations of invasions of privacy and
warrantless searches” (citation omitted)).
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value to or protection of privacy in the context of at least one type of environmental
externality—conduct that gives rise to a common law nuisance. Recognizing that
most environmentally significant individual behaviors do not constitute a common
law nuisance, Section B then considers how privacy values are balanced with the
need for information to support the development and enforcement of environmental
statutes designed to regulate (primarily industrial) conduct that often imposes harm
only in the aggregate. Section C focuses on how the Fourth Amendment has been
applied with respect to enforcement of a subset of environmental statutes—fish and
game laws.
The hunter enforcement cases discussed in Section C provide a particularly
useful analogue for thinking about privacy balancing with respect to
environmentally significant behaviors. As with other environmentally significant
behaviors, the conduct of an individual hunter will generally give rise to an
environmental harm (for example, impacting the health of game populations) only
when aggregated with the actions of others. Moreover, the hunter enforcement cases
provide a context where regulation is being applied primarily to individuals, as
opposed to corporate entities. The hunter enforcement cases suggest potentially
useful guidance for policymakers and courts navigating privacy balancing in the
context of environmentally significant behaviors. Notably, although aggregation is
required for the regulated conduct to give rise to an environmental harm and
although privacy intrusions are incurred by individuals, privacy balancing is
nonetheless often struck in favor of regulatory enforcement in the hunter
enforcement cases. This, in turn, suggests the possibility that privacy balancing
might likewise favor regulation with respect to other environmentally significant
behaviors, provided that the state interest in regulation can be firmly established.
II. PRIVACY AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
A. Nuisance
Common law nuisance is a useful starting point for exploring the intersection
between environmental protection and privacy, both because common law nuisance
embodies principles that are reflected in and continue to influence the application of
the modern environmental statutory regime 30 and because, as described below,
nuisance doctrine can be understood to effect a rather stark waiver of privacy.
Nuisance intersects with privacy in a myriad of ways. Nuisance doctrine seeks,
in part, to protect the privacy of individuals by preventing intrusions on the use and
enjoyment of property; thus, interference with use and enjoyment of property can
arise from diminution of privacy. 31 As the Restatement (Second) of Torts explains,
30
CEEED v. Cal. Coastal Zone Conservation Comm’n, 118 Cal. Rptr. 315, 324 (Ct.
App. 1974) (“Current legislation for environmental and ecological protection constitutes but
‘a sensitizing of and refinement of nuisance law.’”) (quoting CALIFORNIA ZONING PRACTICE,
DONALD G. HAGMAN ET AL., 28–29 (1969 & Supp. 1973)).
31
Pritchett v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Knox Cnty., 85 N.E. 32, 35 (Ind. Ct. App. 1908)
(observing that a county’s construction of a jail caused a neighbor’s “right of privacy [to]
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“Freedom from discomfort and annoyance while using lands is often as important to
a person as freedom from physical interruption with his use or freedom from
detrimental change in the physical condition of the land itself.” 32 On the flip side,
alleged nuisance conduct has been defended on the ground that it was necessary to
protect the alleged nuisancer’s privacy—in one case, for example, a court held that
a neighbor’s high fence was not a nuisance, in part because “the fence served a useful
purpose by protecting the [neighbor’s] privacy . . . .” 33 Some nuisance ordinances
have been challenged on the grounds that they violate fundamental privacy rights.
In City of New York v. New St. Mark’s Baths, 34 for example, a bathhouse
permanently enjoined from maintaining a public nuisance argued that “a right to
privacy prohibits regulation of gay sexual activity in private rooms on the
premises” 35 (the court rejected the argument, citing to precedent for the proposition
that the right to privacy extends only to conduct in a “noncommercial, private
setting” 36).
However, the chief way that nuisance intersects with privacy is embedded in
and flows from a core doctrinal contour of nuisance: the value of the defendant’s
conduct. To evaluate whether conduct gives rise to a nuisance, courts usually
consider the utility or value of the defendant’s conduct. 37 The Restatement (Second)
of Torts, for example, provides that “[o]ne is subject to liability for a private
nuisance if, but only if, his conduct is a legal cause of an invasion of another’s
interest in the private use and enjoyment of land, and the invasion is . . . intentional

be[] invaded” and that “[t]his right is well recognized” and “derived from natural law”);
Begnaud v. Camel Contractors, Inc., 721 So. 2d 550, 554 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (“Whether an
owner of property is liable to his neighbors under the Civil Code Articles of vicinage,
La.Civ.Code arts. 667–669, is a determination to be made by the trier of fact based upon the
reasonableness of the conduct in light of the circumstances, and such an analysis requires
consideration of factors such as the character of the neighborhood, the degree of intrusion
privacy and the effect of the activity on the health and safety of the neighbors.” (citation
omitted)); Omar Saleem, Killing the Proverbial Two Birds with One Stone: Using
Environmental Statutes and Nuisance to Combat the Crime of Illegal Drug Trafficking, 100
DICK. L. REV. 685, 710 (1996) (“Historically, nuisance laws have protected the individual’s
zone of privacy.”).
32
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D cmt. b (1979).
33
Mickel v. Norton, 69 So. 3d 1081, 1083 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (citations omitted).
34
168 A.D.2d 311 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
35
Id. at 311.
36
People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936, 941 (N.Y. 1980).
37
A nuisance can sometimes also be found without considering the utility of the
defendant’s conduct by looking narrowly at the gravity of the harm imposed on the plaintiff.
E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 829A (1979) (“An intentional invasion of
another’s interest in the use and enjoyment of land is unreasonable if the harm resulting from
the invasion is severe and greater than the other should be required to bear without
compensation.”); see also Jeff L. Lewin, Boomer and the American Law of Nuisance: Past,
Present, and Future, 54 ALB. L. REV. 189, 229–35 (1990) (characterizing this approach as
the “plaintiff-centered” perspective on nuisance law).
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and unreasonable . . . .” 38 Conduct can be “unreasonable” so as to support a finding
of nuisance, “if the gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of the actor’s
conduct[,]” 39 and the utility of conduct can be assessed by considering “(a) the social
value that the law attaches to the primary purpose of the conduct; (b) the suitability
of the conduct to the character of the locality; and (c) the impracticability of
preventing or avoiding the invasion.” 40 Although there is muddiness and variation
in the precise manner in which different jurisdictions incorporate the utility or value
of the defendant’s conduct into the analysis of whether the conduct gives rise to an
actionable nuisance, most jurisdictions assess the value or utility of the defendant’s
alleged nuisance conduct in some fashion. 41
Accordingly, the legal test for determining whether conduct gives rise to a
nuisance compels scrutiny of the conduct at issue. This is reflected in the application
of discovery rules in nuisance actions. Model nuisance interrogatories, for example,
request inter alia that the defendant “[d]escribe the nature of the business
conducted” at the property, “[s]et forth the purpose and use of the real estate of the
defendant,” and “[s]tate what caused the soot to emit from the factory.” 42 Discovery
rules also generally permit the inspection of property. 43 Entry onto property is most
appropriate “where the current condition of property is at issue or may have
evidentiary value,” 44 as is often the case in nuisance actions. Some courts appear
more inclined to grant broad discovery to “enhance the fact-finding process” in cases
“affecting not only the property rights of the plaintiff but environmental rights of the
public.” 45
In granting discovery orders, including in nuisance actions, courts are meant to
consider privacy interests. For example, in a case where an individual alleged that a
neighboring residence constituted a nuisance based on the condition and
maintenance of the property, a trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion to compel
discovery to investigate the nuisance that would have permitted the plaintiff to

38

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1979).
Id. § 826(a).
40
Id. § 828.
41
For an excellent overview of the development and application of utility assessments
in nuisance doctrine, see Lewin, supra note 37, at 191–236.
42
10B MARC G. PERLIN & STEVEN H. BLUM, MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE SERIES:
PROCEDURAL FORMS ANNOTATED § 79:31 (6th ed. 2009).
43
FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(2) (“A party may serve on any other party a request within the
scope of Rule 26(b) to permit entry onto designated land or other property possessed or
controlled by the responding party, so that the requesting party may inspect, measure, survey,
photograph, test, or sample the property or any designated object or operation on it.”); see
8B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
2206, (3d ed. Supp. 2014) (observing that “[t]his procedure has been fruitfully used in a
number of cases”).
44
15A WASH. PRAC. HANDBOOK CIV. PROC. § 50.1 (2013–2014 ed.).
45
Versatile Metals, Inc. v. Union Corp., Civ. A. No. 85-4085, 1986 WL 8720, at *3
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 1986) (granting discovery order for inspection and testing of PCBcontaminated property).
39
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inspect, measure, photograph, test, and sample the neighboring property. 46 The trial
court’s discovery order was vacated on appeal on the ground that the trial court failed
to apply the proper legal standard to the motion. 47 The reviewing court reasoned that
in crafting discovery orders, trial courts “must balance the degree to which the
proposed inspection would aid in the search for truth against the burdens and dangers
posed by the inspection, and limit the frequency or extent of use of the discovery
methods to prevent undue burden.” In this case, “the record indicates that the trial
court did not undertake an analysis of the burdens and risks the Gilletts’ discovery
request posed to Fletcher’s privacy, but, instead, considered only the test for
relevance . . . .” 48
However, broad discovery orders are regularly granted in nuisance actions. In
Whittle v. Weber, 49 the plaintiff alleged that his neighbor’s property gave rise to a
nuisance and sought a discovery order to inspect the neighbor’s property “for
purposes of conducting an inspection of the items placed upon [the] land to
determine whether or not hazardous substances or substances of any other nature
exist[ed] that could present a threat to the neighbors surrounding [the] property
and/or the ground water beneath their property.” 50 The superior court granted the
discovery order with the limitation that the inspection not “extend to inside any
residence.” 51 On appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court held that the discovery order did
not violate the neighbor’s right to privacy because the property was directly at issue
in the case, the inspection was specific about the information sought, and the order
did not permit inspection of the inside of the residence. 52
The plaintiff in another case, Coldani v. Hamm, 53 sued a neighbor who operated
a dairy farm alleging that runoff from the dairy farm was contaminating groundwater
in violation of the CWA and interfering with plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of his
property, thereby constituting a state law public nuisance. At one point during the
protracted (and ultimately unsuccessful) litigation, the court authorized an
inspection of the dairy farm property under Rule 34 “for purposes of testing the soil,
sediment and groundwater.” 54 The need for the inspection was explained by the
court as follows:
Plaintiff intends to take samples . . . to show not only that nitrates exist in
the groundwater, but also in order to trace the nitrates to defendants’
ranching operations. In particular, plaintiff believes that antibiotics,
hormones, nutritional supplements, pesticides and fertilizers used in
defendants’ ranching operations will appear together with nitrates in the
46

See Gillett v. Conner, 133 P.3d 960, 961 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006).
Id.
48
Id. at 961, 964.
49
243 P.3d 208 (Alaska 2010).
50
Id. at 210.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 213.
53
No. CIV S-07-0660 JAM EFB, 2008 WL 3992719, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2008).
54
Id. at *1.
47
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allegedly contaminated groundwater. Plaintiff argues that the presence of
such substances in the groundwater will link Lima Ranch to the alleged
nitrate contamination. 55
The court also granted the plaintiff’s motion to compel responses to five
interrogatories that asked the owners of the dairy farm “to identify all antibiotics,
hormones and nutritional supplements administered to livestock at [the dairy farm]
from 1990 to present” and “to identify all fertilizers and pesticides used at [the dairy
farm] from 1990 to present.” 56
And, perhaps most notably, in one case involving nuisance-like facts, a
potential nuisance defendant was authorized to inspect and test the plaintiff’s
property. In Martin v. Reynolds Metals Corporation, 57 the operator of an aluminum
plant, fearing that a neighbor who raised cattle was going to bring suit alleging that
fluoride emissions from the plant damaged his property and cattle, petitioned to
examine the neighbor’s real property and cattle.58 The court upheld an order under
Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizing the plant owner to enter
and inspect the neighbor’s property, including “[o]btaining specimen samples of
forage, feeds, air, water, soil, vegetation and mineral supplements,” “[e]xamining
the pastures and supplemental feed” of the cattle, “[p]hotographing the animals,
foodstuffs, pastures and facilities,” and examining the cattle, including by taking
urine samples. 59
The imperative to assess the utility of the defendant’s conduct in nuisance
actions, and balance it against the harm to the plaintiff, can thus compel an invasive
fact finding process. Yet, there is little discussion of how utility assessments in
nuisance inquiries affect privacy. This is, perhaps, not surprising. All litigation to
some extent opens one up to potentially invasive discovery and the disclosure of
private information. 60 Claims to privacy for nuisance conduct may be unlikely or
weak because at least some aspects of the conduct are necessarily not private as they
are manifest outside of the nuisancer’s property. There is no mystery about the
conduct underlying many common sources of nuisance—a smokestack bellowing
smoke or a penned livestock generating a stench. The interest in privacy with respect
to nuisance conduct may simply be subordinate to the interests of other property
owners. Nuisancers, of course, forfeit far more than privacy with respect to their
nuisance conduct; they can lose the freedom to engage in the conduct all together,
or at least for free, thus rendering the loss of privacy relatively less notable.
Nuisancers may even lose the possibility for compensation for a taking under the
55

Id.
Id. at *2.
57
297 F.2d 49 (9th Cir. 1961).
58
Id. at 52.
59
Id. at 53 n.1.
60
See Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the
Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1145–49 (2002) (describing the information generated
about individuals during civil and criminal proceedings and observing that “[c]ourt records
are potentially the most revealing records about individuals”).
56
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“nuisance exception” to takings, which provides that there is no regulatory taking
where property is deemed a nuisance under the common law, including with respect
to actions taken under environmental statutes. 61
Another possibility, and one that is intriguing for understanding environmental
privacy, is that the indifference to privacy in the context of nuisance reflects, at least
in part, a sense that claims to privacy for nuisance conduct are waived by the
nuisancer’s decision to impose an environmental externality on others.62 This
possible quid pro quo between the decision to impose an externality and privacy
finds clear expression in a line of cases invoking the community caretaking doctrine
pursuant to which some courts have found that government officers can enter
property to abate a nuisance without a warrant. 63 In United States v. Rohrig, 64 for
example, officers responding to noise complaints entered a home without a warrant
and seized marijuana discovered in plain view. 65 In upholding the warrantless entry
and seizure of the marijuana, the Sixth Circuit reasoned:
Just as one’s expectation of privacy diminishes as he ventures beyond his
doorway, . . . Defendant here undermined his right to be left alone by
projecting loud noises into the neighborhood in the wee hours of the
morning, thereby significantly disrupting his neighbors’ peace. Indeed, in
this case, we cannot protect Defendant’s interest in maintaining the
61

See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029–32 (1992) (explaining that
confiscatory regulations “must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background
principles of the State’s law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership”).
Id. at 1029. Notably, in describing the inquiry to be undertaken to assess whether the nuisance
exception applies, the Supreme Court cites to the Restatement (Second) of Torts sections 826
and 827, and advises that it will “ordinarily entail[] . . . analysis of, among other things, the
degree of harm to public lands and resources, or adjacent private property, posed by the
claimant’s proposed activities, . . . the social value of the claimant’s activities and their
suitability to the locality in question . . . .” Id. at 1030–31 (citations omitted).
62
The conduct underlying a nuisance must generally be intentional, although that term
is, importantly, understood to include simply knowing that engaging in the conduct is causing
or substantially certain to cause the nuisancing effect. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 825(b) (1979).
63
See United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506, 1522 (6th Cir. 1996) (upholding
warrantless intrusion based upon nuisance created by loud music that severely disturbed
neighbors); People v. Lanthier, 488 P.2d 625, 628 (Cal. 1971) (upholding warrantless search
of locker based on smell that led to discovery of marijuana); Olson v. Maryland, 56 A.3d
576, 606 – 07 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012) (upholding warrantless entry to abate noise
nuisance). Note that several circuits have limited the community caretaking doctrine, and
reliance on it, for warrantless searches to automobiles, and some courts have noted that it
may simply be a type of exigent circumstance. See, e.g., Ray v. Township of Warren, 626
F.3d 170, 175–77 (3rd Cir. 2010) (observing that “[t]here is some confusion among the
circuits as to whether the community caretaking exception . . . applies to warrantless searches
of the home” and listing cases).
64
98 F.3d 1506 (6th Cir. 1996).
65
Id. at 1509.
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privacy of his home without diminishing his neighbors’ interests in
maintaining the privacy of their homes. 66
In cases applying the community caretaking doctrine to nuisance abatement, there
is no mention of privacy with respect to the action causing the nuisance—it seems
to be assumed that there is no privacy in the nuisance conduct itself. These cases
typically involve entry to abate the nuisance during which some evidence of
contraband is discovered (drugs, guns, etc.) that is unrelated to the nuisance. The
reasoning in these cases often includes reference to the fact that by engaging in the
nuisance activity—that imposes an externality on others (noise, smell)—the
individual has waived his or her expectation of privacy. These cases thus seem to
reflect a view that there is little expectation of privacy for nuisance conduct and,
moreover, that by engaging in conduct that gives rise to a nuisance, individuals can
effect an even broader waiver of privacy.
Evaluating nuisance law from a privacy perspective thus suggests, broadly, that
the law affords little value to or protection of privacy in conduct that imposes at least
one type of environmental externality, a common law nuisance. Ultimately,
however, nuisance does not provide a particularly satisfying analogue for exploring
privacy with respect to environmentally significant behaviors. With respect to both
nuisance and environmentally significant individual behaviors, the source of the
externality can be an individual. However, the nature of the externality imposed by
the individual in each context is distinct. Externalities occasioned by
environmentally significant individual behaviors often produce environmental
harms only in the aggregate, when combined with the behaviors of many other
individuals. And often the harms produced are widespread, dispersed, distant in
time, and cannot be traced back to a particular individual.67 An individual likely
could not be held liable in nuisance (or for another tort) for this type of aggregated
harm occasioned by an environmentally significant individual behavior. 68 Tethered
as it is to traditional understandings of duty, proximate cause, and causation,
nuisance is “most useful for addressing conflicts between a single source of pollution
66

Id. at 1522.
See Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV, supra note 1, at 589–90.
68
Imagine, for example, a public nuisance suit premised on the theory that the tailpipe
emissions from an individual’s car contributed to climate change. It is hard to imagine how
the requirements of standing could be satisfied—let alone duty, causation, proximate cause,
and breach—or the requirement to show “an unreasonable interference with a right common
to the general public.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979); see David A.
Grossman, Warming Up to a Not-So-Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate Change Litigation,
28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 28 (2003) (observing that “individual consumers such as drivers
and users of electricity do not contribute ‘substantially’ to climate change; as such, their
small individual contributions would not meet the standards for legal causation”). For an
excellent discussion of the difficulties of applying existing tort doctrine in the context of
climate change, and with respect to small contributors to large problems more generally, see
Douglas A. Kysar, What Climate Change Can Do About Tort Law, 41 ENVTL. L. 1, 54
(2011).
67
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and a few neighbors.” 69 The difficulties using nuisance to address modern
environmental problems involving “numerous and diverse pollutants emanating
from widely dispersed sources affect[ing] large populations . . .” 70 spurred the
creation of modern environmental statutes, which, as discussed next, also intersect
with privacy in interesting ways.
B. Environmental Laws
Common law nuisance has, of course, evolved into a diverse panoply of
environmental laws that require significant information for their implementation,
thereby intersecting with interests in privacy. 71 The discussion that follows identifies
some of the ways that environmental laws demand information, the privacy issues
that this can raise, and the accommodation struck between the regulatory need for
information and privacy interests. The present survey is not complete—it does not
claim to represent a categorical review of all environmental laws from all
jurisdictions—but employs representative examples to illustrate some of the
common privacy issues that arise with respect to the collection and use of
information in support of environmental regulations that are most relevant to
thinking about privacy in the context of environmentally significant individual
behaviors. At the outset, it is useful to distinguish between an environmental
regulator requesting the submission of information (interrogation) (for example,
requiring the submission of information to obtain a permit) and a regulator taking
information, usually in the context of enforcement (surveillance) (for example,
conducting searches or inspections to enforce an environmental statute). 72 Examples
69
ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND
POLICY 75 (6th ed. 2009).
70
Id.
71
This includes both the provision of information to regulators and the public. Pursuant
to the citizen suit provisions of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act
(EPCRA), for example, individuals alleging a violation of the reporting required under the
statute can use traditional discovery mechanisms to obtain detailed information about the
release of covered chemicals by an EPCRA-covered entity. Model interrogatories, for
example, suggest that the citizen suit plaintiff should request that the defendant “state every
fact that supports” the defendant’s assertions regarding whether it is subject to and has
complied with EPCRA reporting requirements. 55 AM. JUR. 3D PROOF OF FACTS § 43 (2013)
(“Do you contend that you have completed and submitted a toxic chemical release form for
each toxic chemical released during the preceding calendar year? If your answer to the
preceding interrogatory is yes, please state every fact that supports your contention.”).
Similarly, pursuant to the citizen suit provisions of CERCLA, individuals alleging a violation
of the statute can use traditional discovery mechanisms to obtain detailed information about
the release of CERCLA hazardous substances by a facility, including, for example, an
interrogatory request to “identify the hazardous substances and/or the extremely hazardous
substances that have been or are being released from your facility into the environment.” Id.
72
I borrow the conceptual distinction between interrogation and surveillance from
Professor Daniel J. Solove. Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV.
477, 490–505 (2006). Professor Solove describes the distinction as: “[s]urveillance is the
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drawn from the context of environmentally significant individual behaviors could
include, with respect to interrogation, requirements that individuals reveal to
regulators the content of their vehicle’s tailpipe emissions by undergoing an
emissions check 73 and, with respect to surveillance, a regulator’s inspection of an
individual’s private property to ascertain the presence of a jurisdictional wetland
under the CWA. 74 This Section proceeds by providing an overview of the legal
treatment of interrogation and then focuses on the legal treatment of environmental
surveillance—specifically on the application of the Fourth Amendment to
surveillance conducted in support of environmental statutes.
1. Interrogation
Attempts to increase interrogation by creating new requirements that
individuals provide information about environmental behaviors—such as a
requirement that, like annual taxes, individuals submit annual greenhouse gas
reporting forms—may be an important tool as policymakers seek to better address
individuals as sources of environmental harm, 75 but it would likely engender privacy
objections. 76 The present analysis does not, however, focus on privacy in the context
of government requests for information from individuals, largely because there is
presently little relevant law to explore. As discussed below, the existence and scope
of constitutional, privacy-based limits on the government’s power to require
information from individuals remains uncertain and, while there is intense interest
in developing protections for information privacy, 77 existing statutes have only

watching, listening to, or recording of an individual’s activities. [And] [i]nterrogation
consists of various forms of questioning or probing for information.” Id. at 490. Further, “[t]o
some degree, surveillance resembles interrogation, for both involve the involuntary gathering
of information. Interrogation, however, occurs with the conscious awareness of the subject;
surveillance can be clandestine.” Id. at 500.
73
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7511a, 7512a (2006); 40 C.F.R. § 51.350 (2013).
74
For a description of CWA inspections, see supra notes 28, 53–56 and accompanying
text.
75
See CZARNEZKI, supra note 1, at 61 (proposing a national environmental census
requiring an individual self-assessment of household environmental impact, including
activities that give rise to GHG emissions); Vandenbergh et al., Individual Carbon
Emissions, supra note 1, at 1729–31 (proposing an Individual Carbon Release Inventory).
76
See Solove, supra note 72, at 499 (describing privacy objections to census questions
and observing that “[i]n the late nineteenth century, there was a loud public outcry when the
U.S. census began including more and more questions relating to personal affairs, such as
marital status, literacy, property ownership, health, and finances.”).
77
See e.g., Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New
Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1815−16 (2011)
(“Information privacy law has reached a turning point. The current debate about the topic is
vigorous . . . . Moreover, the Executive Branch, independent agencies, and Congress are all
considering different paths to revitalize information privacy.”).

16

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 1

limited relevance for the submission of information in support of environmental
regulation. 78
In Whalen v. Roe, 79 the Supreme Court recognized a constitutional right to
information privacy grounded in an “individual interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters.” 80 Whalen involved a challenge to a New York statute requiring
the submission of a form to the New York State Department of Health that included
the patient’s name when certain drugs were prescribed. The Court recognized that
“[t]he mere existence in readily available form of the information about patients’ use
of Schedule II drugs creates a genuine concern that the information will become
publicly known . . . ”; however, the court upheld the law, finding that the threat of
public disclosure was not “sufficiently grievous” to give rise to a constitutional
infirmity. 81
Notably, the Court was careful to distinguish the collection of individual
information by a government agency (interrogation) from searches subject to Fourth
Amendment protections (surveillance) that it characterized as “involv[ing]
78

For example, although applicable to federal agencies, including those implementing
environmental statutes, the Privacy Act of 1974 provides only broad guidelines regarding
the collection of information by a federal agency. It requires that federal agencies that
maintain a system of records “maintain in [their] records only such information about an
individual as is relevant and necessary to accomplish a purpose of the agency required to be
accomplished by statute or by executive order of the President.” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(1)
(2012). The Privacy Act further requires that an agency
inform each individual whom it asks to supply information . . . (A) the authority
. . . which authorizes the solicitation of the information and whether disclosure
of such information is mandatory or voluntary; (B) the principal purpose or
purposes for which the information is intended to be used; (C) the routine uses
which may be made of the information, as published pursuant to paragraph
(4)(D) of this subsection; and (D) the effects on him, if any, of not providing all
or any part of the requested information.
Id. § 552a(e)(3); accord 1 C.F.R. § 304.32 (2014). Notably, these Privacy Act provisions are
subject to exceptions. E.g., 40 C.F.R. § 16.11(e) (2013) (exempting the collection of
information in support of EPA criminal enforcement). A number of environmental statutes
contain mechanisms that allow entities to protect confidential business information or trade
secrets, but this has little relevance as applied to individuals. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C § 1905
(2012) (setting forth protections for confidential information under CERCLA, which is
defined to mean information that “concerns or relates to the trade secrets, processes,
operations, style of work, or apparatus, or to the identity, confidential statistical data, amount
or source of any income, profits, losses, or expenditures of any person, firm, partnership,
corporation, or association; or . . . income return or copy thereof or any book containing any
abstract or particulars”); 33 U.S.C. § 1318(b) (2012) (providing that confidential information
provided to regulators under the CWA should not be publicly disclosed); 42 U.S.C § 9604(e)
(2012); 40 C.F.R. § 2.203(b) (2013).
79
429 U.S. 589 (1977).
80
Id. at 599.
81
Id. at 600.
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affirmative, unannounced, narrowly focused intrusions into individual privacy.” 82
The Court endorsed a scholar’s observation that there are three “‘facets’” to the
constitutional right of privacy:
The first is the right of the individual to be free in his private affairs from
governmental surveillance and intrusion. The second is the right of an
individual not to have his private affairs made public by the government.
The third is the right of an individual to be free in action, thought,
experience, and belief from governmental compulsion. 83
The Court declared that “[t]he first of the facets . . . is directly protected by the
Fourth Amendment” and was not implicated in the present case, which involved
only the latter two facets of the constitutional right to privacy. 84 Whalen thus
distinguished between information privacy and those privacy interests protected by
the Fourth Amendment. The constitutional right to information privacy articulated
in Whalen has not been much explored or developed since. 85 Moreover, Whalen
speaks most directly to a government duty “to protect privacy when it collects
personal data” 86 and less to its ability to collect that information in the first instance.
Indeed, in Whalen the Court seemed resigned to government collection of copious
information about individuals:
Even without public disclosure, it is, of course, true that private
information must be disclosed to the authorized employees of the New
York Department of Health. Such disclosures, however, are not . . .
meaningfully distinguishable from a host of other unpleasant invasions of
privacy that are associated with many facets of health care. . . .
[D]isclosures of private medical information to doctors, to hospital
personnel, to insurance companies, and to public health agencies are often
an essential part of modern medical practice even when the disclosure
may reflect unfavorably on the character of the patient.87

82

Id. at 604 n.32.
Id. at 599 n.24 (quoting Philip B. Kurland, The Private I, U. OF CHI. MAG., Autumn
1976, at 7).
84
Id.
85
Solove, supra note 60, at 1205−06 n.413 (observing that “the Court has done little to
develop the right of information privacy” and that its contours remain unclear); see also
Solove, supra note 72, at 504 (detailing the lack of legal protection in the context of
interrogation and concluding that “[p]rivacy law’s theory of interrogation is not only
incoherent, it is nearly nonexistent. Despite recognizing the harms and problems of
interrogation—compulsion, divulgence of private information, and forced betrayal—the law
only addresses them in limited situations”).
86
Solove, supra note 60, at 1204.
87
Whalen, 429 U.S. at 602.
83
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Ultimately, if environmental regulation seeks more information from
individuals, that information collection may be contested using theories of
information privacy. In one interesting case, for example, a district court in New
Mexico dismissed an action against a member of the Isleta Pueblo for knowing
possession of parts of a golden eagle without a permit in violation of the Bald and
Golden Eagle Protection Act in part because the court deemed the procedures for
obtaining a permit under the Act to be too invasive of privacy. 88 The court reasoned:
[T]he intricate application procedure, as it currently operates, is itself
unnecessarily intrusive and hostile to religious privacy when viewed in
light of the conservation goals it seeks to achieve. The applicant must
certify that he is an Indian and will use the feathers or parts for religious
purposes. He must identify religious leaders and ceremonies to federal
officials so that the government may gauge the religious character of the
proposed use. These procedures invade the private, even secret, province
of Indian religious conviction and offend the ancient tradition of pueblo
religious independence. . . . The evidence at trial established that the
federal administrative apparatus erected to accommodate Indian religious
needs is utterly offensive and ultimately ineffectual. The application
process is cumbersome, intrusive and demonstrates a palpable
insensitivity to Indian religious beliefs.89
However, at present there are so few instances where government requests for
information in support of environmental regulation (interrogation) have been
challenged on grounds of information privacy that the present analysis looks
primarily to the resolution of disputes about environmental surveillance grounded in
the Fourth Amendment.
2. Surveillance
Environmental regulators also frequently obtain information through
environmental surveillance. 90 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) regulations
88
United States v. Abeyta, 632 F. Supp. 1301, 1304, 1307 (D.N.M. 1986). For another
example, see Brown v. Department of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife, 577 A.2d 1184 (Me.
1990), where the court held that a requirement that noncommercial river rafters file a
registration statement prior to river rafting did not violate the right to privacy, the Fourth
Amendment, or the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 1186.
89
Abeyta, 632 F. Supp at 1304, 1307.
90
Notably, private individuals may also obtain significant information through
discovery in the context of citizen suits, although that is not the focus of the present
discussion. Model interrogatories suggested for a person or entity alleged to have taken a
species in violation of the Endangered Species Act demonstrate the broad scope of
information that may be sought. 27 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 421 § 6 (1994) (“Set forth
with particularity all activities, actions, or work done by the DEFENDANT on [site of
alleged takings] since [date]. . . . Set forth with particularity all planned activities, actions, or
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implementing the CWA, for example, advocate surveillance by the Corps to “detect
unauthorized activities requiring permits” and encourage district engineers to
“consider developing joint surveillance procedures with Federal, state, or local
agencies.” 91 Courts have upheld administrative searches aimed at ascertaining
whether a property contains a jurisdictional wetland. 92 Unlike interrogation,
however, environmental surveillance generates significant legal scrutiny. 93 This
Section provides an overview of environmental surveillance and its legal treatment
under the Fourth Amendment both to offer a general overview of how existing
environmental statutes balance implementation and privacy and to provide
background for a close analysis of environmental surveillance in the specific context
of the enforcement of fish and game laws (the hunter enforcement cases).
Most environmental statutes grant regulators the authority to conduct
administrative searches. 94 Statutes granting this authority include inter alia core
work to be done by the DEFENDANT on [site of alleged takings]. . . . State with specificity
any and all remedial measures and any changes whatsoever to the manufacturing processes,
project, development, or any other activity of the DEFENDANT that have been undertaken
to minimize or mitigate impacts on any endangered or THREATENED SPECIES and/or its
habitat.”).
91
33 C.F.R. § 326.3(a) (2013).
92
Palmieri v. Lynch, 392 F.3d 73, 81 (2d Cir. 2004) (applying “the special needs
doctrine to analyze the environmental regulatory scheme that provides for warrantless
inspections pursuant to tidal-wetlands permit applications”); In re Alameda Cnty. Assessor’s
Parcel Nos. 537-801-2-4 and 537-850-9, 672 F. Supp. 1278, 1287 (N.D. Cal. 1987)
(upholding EPA access to farm property and concluding that “[t]he EPA is justified under
the present circumstances in conducting a jurisdictional determination of the wetland status
of petitioners’ farm pursuant to an administrative search warrant granted under § 308”).
93
Joseph G. Block & Judson W. Starr, “Knock, Knock.” “Who’s There?” “EPA
Criminal Agents That’s Who.” 55 ROCKY MOUNTAIN MIN. L. INST.12-1, § 12.02 (2009)
(“Should the government attempt a warrantless entry, search, or seizure, the authors
recommend that the company voice its objection for the record, to begin laying the
groundwork for a legal challenge to any evidence the government seizes.”).
94
For an overview of EPA inspection and evaluation authority, see
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/monitoring/inspections/,archived at http://perma.cc/FJ9D4VT3 (last visited Mar. 7, 2014). The precise contours of an administrative search are not
clear: “Most experts agree that government searches that are conducted pursuant to a neutral
policy aimed at a non-law enforcement purpose are administrative searches, but they also
recognize that many searches that do not fall within this definition are administrative as
well.” Eve Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111 COLUM. L. REV.
254, 257 n.15 (2011). Although it is common for environmental statutes to authorize
administrative searches, the practice does occasion objection on privacy grounds. E.g., H.R.
3875, 103d Cong. §§ 3(a), 4(a) (1994); S. 1915, 103d Cong. (1994) (proposing legislation to
require federal agencies to comply with applicable state and tribal laws relating to private
property rights and privacy and prohibiting federal agencies that are implementing the
Endangered Species Act or wetlands regulations from entering private property for the
purpose of gathering information without written consent from the owner.); see also S. 605,
104th Cong. §§ 503(a), 504(a) (1995) (proposing owner consent requirements for agency
entry to private property).

20

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 1

environmental statutes such as the CWA; 95 Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA); 96 Clean Air Act (CAA); 97 Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA); 98 Toxic Substances Control Act
(TSCA); 99 and Endangered Species Act (ESA). 100 Generally speaking, the Fourth
Amendment has been interpreted to require a warrant for an administrative search
involving a private individual 101 or commercial entity. 102 There are, however, a
95

33 U.S.C. § 1318(a)(B) (2012) (“[T]he Administrator or his authorized representative
. . . shall have a right of entry to, upon, or through any premises in which an effluent source
is located or in which any records required to be maintained under clause (A) of this
subsection are located, and . . . may at reasonable times have access to and copy any records,
inspect any monitoring equipment or method required under clause (A), and sample any
effluents which the owner or operator of such source is required to sample under such
clause.”).
96
42 U.S.C. § 6927(a) (2012) (“For the purposes of developing or assisting in the
development of any regulation or enforcing the provisions of this chapter, . . . such officers,
employees or representatives are authorized—(1) to enter at reasonable times any
establishment or other place where hazardous wastes are or have been generated, stored,
treated, disposed of, or transported from; (2) to inspect and obtain samples from any person
of any such wastes and samples of any containers or labeling for such wastes.”).
97
42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(2) (2012) (“[T]he Administrator or his authorized representative,
upon presentation of his credentials—(A) shall have a right of entry to, upon, or through any
premises of such person or in which any records required to be maintained under paragraph
(1) of this section are located, and (B) may at reasonable times have access to and copy any
records, inspect any monitoring equipment or method required under paragraph (1), and
sample any emissions which such person is required to sample under paragraph (1).”).
98
42 U.S.C. § 9604(e)(3) (2012) (“Any officer, employee, or representative described
in paragraph (1) is authorized to enter at reasonable times any of the following: (A) Any
vessel, facility, establishment, or other place or property where any hazardous substance or
pollutant or contaminant may be or has been generated, stored, treated, disposed of, or
transported from. (B) Any vessel, facility, establishment, or other place or property from
which or to which a hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant has been or may have
been released. (C) Any vessel, facility, establishment, or other place or property where such
release is or may be threatened. (D) Any vessel, facility, establishment, or other place or
property where entry is needed to determine the need for response or the appropriate response
or to effectuate a response action under this subchapter.”).
99
15 U.S.C.§ 2610(a) (2012) (“For purposes of administering this chapter, the
Administrator, and any duly designated representative of the Administrator, may inspect any
establishment, facility, or other premises in which chemical substances, mixtures, or products
subject to subchapter IV of this chapter are manufactured, processed, stored, or held . . . .”).
100
16 U.S.C. § 1540(e)(1)–(3) (2012) (granting agencies the authority to enforce its
provisions, including by “execut[ing] and serv[ing] any . . . search warrant” and “search[ing]
and seiz[ing], with or without a warrant, as authorized by law,” as well as authorizing district
courts to issue warrants in support of agency enforcement).
101
Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
102
See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544–45 (1967) (holding that “warrants are a
necessary and a tolerable limitation on the right to enter upon and inspect commercial
premises,” but observing that “[t]he agency’s particular demand for access will of course be
measured, in terms of probable cause to issue a warrant, against a flexible standard of
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number of caveats and exceptions. Those caveats and exceptions of particular
relevance in the environmental context are discussed in greater detail below.
Under the “open fields” doctrine, the Supreme Court holds that there is no
expectation of privacy, and thus no Fourth Amendment protection, for “activities
conducted out of doors in fields, except in the area immediately surrounding the
home.” 103 It is not unusual for environmental administrative searches to involve
inspections of outdoor areas and numerous cases have upheld warrantless
administrative searches by environmental regulators under the open fields
doctrine. 104 The Supreme Court, for example, has held that warrantless entry by a
state environmental official on commercial premises for purposes of observing the
quality of smoke emitted from a facility did not violate the Fourth Amendment as it
fell within the open fields exception. 105 The Court further held that the EPA did not
conduct a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment when it took aerial
photographs of an industrial plant complex as part of a site inspection under the
Clean Air Act. 106 Notably, however, the court found it important that the entity
observed was a commercial entity and not a private residence.107
The open fields doctrine does, of course, have limitations. In Reeves Brothers,
Inc. v. EPA, 108 a district court in Virginia held that EPA agents violated the Fourth
Amendment by entering plaintiff’s property without consent and removing water
and soil samples. 109 In that case, the agency, while investigating the possible
presence of hazardous substances pursuant to CERCLA, failed to follow the
procedures for access set out in section 104(e) of CERCLA. The court reasoned that
the agency’s access to the property likely did not require a warrant pursuant to the
open fields exception, but that the taking of water and soil samples did not fall within
the open fields exception. 110 The court, considering whether the plaintiff had
reasonableness that takes into account the public need for effective enforcement of the
particular regulation involved”).
103
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 173, 178 (1984); see also Dow Chem. Co. v.
United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (upholding warrantless aerial inspection under the
CAA); Air Pollution Variance Bd v. W. Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861, 865 (1974) (upholding
warrantless EPA inspection of smoke plume).
104
E.g., United States v. Acquest Wehrle, LLC, No. 09-CV-637C(F), 2010 WL
1708528, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2010) (holding that entry onto private property to enforce
the CWA fell within the open fields exception); State v. Paxton, 615 N.E.2d 1086, 1092
(Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (upholding warrantless inspection of commercial property improperly
used for solid waste disposal).
105
Air Pollution Variance Bd., 416 U.S. at 864–65.
106
Dow Chem. Co., 476 U.S. at 232.
107
Id. at 237 n.4 (“We find it important that this is not an area immediately adjacent to
a private home, where privacy expectations are most heightened.”).
108
956 F. Supp. 665 (W.D. Va. 1995).
109
Id. at 670; see also Hardesty v. Sacramento Metro. Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 935 F.
Supp. 2d 968, 987–88 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (declining to dismiss action challenging the
warrantless search of a mine by an official from California’s Department of Fish and Game
under the open fields or closely regulated industry doctrine).
110
Reeves Brothers, Inc., 956 F. Supp. at 669.
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exhibited an actual expectation of privacy and whether the expectation was one
society recognizes as reasonable, found that the plaintiff had a reasonable
expectation of privacy to the soil beneath the surface of the open field where the
rubber materials in question had been purposefully buried and surrounded by a fence
with “No Trespassing” signs. 111 The Supreme Court has similarly held that there is
no expectation of privacy in (and hence no Fourth Amendment protection for)
garbage. 112 For this reason, environmental regulators’ warrantless collection and
testing of wastes and effluent has been upheld. 113
Other relevant exceptions with respect to environmental administrative
searches are searches conducted with consent and searches involving a closely
regulated entity. When an individual or entity consents to a search, regulators need
not obtain a warrant. 114 Many administrative searches in the environmental realm
constitute inspections of regulated entities operating pursuant to required permits.
Often, environmental permits provide for inspections by regulators. Regulations
implementing the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) under
the CWA, for example, provide that NPDES permits “shall allow the Director, or an
authorized representative . . . to . . . [e]nter upon the permittee’s premises where a
regulated facility or activity is located or conducted.” 115 Courts have upheld
warrantless searches under some environmental statutes on the ground that an entity
possessing a permit thereby consents to warrantless administrative searches. 116 And,

111

Id. at 670.
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40–41 (1988).
113
E.g., Riverdale Mills Corp. v. Pimpare, 392 F.3d 55, 64 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding a
business had no reasonable expectation of privacy in wastewater flowing irretrievably into a
public sewer system) (citing California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40–41 (1988)).
114
E.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (“It is . . . well settled
that one of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and
probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent.”). Of course, the consent
must be deemed effective by the court. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 10.2(b), at 51–53 (David C. Baum ed., 5th ed.
2012) (discussing the application of the voluntariness test for Fourth Amendment consent in
the context of administrative searches).
115
40 C.F.R. § 122.41(i) (2007).
116
E.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. EPA, 716 F.2d 1187, 1190 (7th Cir.1983) (upholding
inspections to assess permit violations under the CWA with only an administrative warrant);
United States v. Hajduk, 396 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1227–28 (D. Colo. 2005) (upholding
warrantless search conducted pursuant to NPDES permit and observing that “[i]n return for
the privilege of discharging waste, Defendants necessarily consented to application of the
City Code and Permit requirements as a matter of law under the Fourth Amendment”). But
see People v. Hedges, 447 N.Y.S.2d 1007, 1011 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk Cnty. 1982) (declining to
sanction warrantless search of a shellfish establishment on the basis of a permit, observing
that “it is not persuasive to argue that this section establishes that the search was consented
to because acquiescence to the search was a condition of the permit,” and concluding that
“‘[n]o state may require, as a condition of doing business, a blanket submission to
warrantless searches at any time and for any purpose’” (quoting Finn’s Liquor Shop, Inc. v.
112
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practically speaking, most environmental agencies seeking to obtain access to
property adopt a policy of first requesting consent, and this consent is often
granted. 117 Thus, a significant number of environmental administrative searches
proceed with consent and no warrant.
Warrantless administrative searches have also been upheld under an exception
relating to longstanding or pervasive government regulation (often referred to as the
closely regulated business exception). The rationales for the exception include that
warrantless searches are necessary for implementation of a regulatory scheme;
expectations of privacy are lower with respect to commercial or business premises
than residences; business owners have lower expectations of privacy where
government regulation is pervasive or longstanding (because the long history of
government regulation provides notice and consent can thus be assumed); and
relevant regulations governing the searches provide adequate constitutional
safeguards. 118 As explained by the Supreme Court,
A warrant may not be constitutionally required when Congress has
reasonably determined that warrantless searches are necessary to further
a regulatory scheme, and the federal regulatory presence is sufficiently
comprehensive and defined that the owner of commercial property cannot
help but be aware that his property will be subject to periodic inspections
undertaken for specific purposes. 119
For the exception to apply, three circumstances must be present. First, there must be
a substantial government interest that the warrantless inspection furthers. 120 Second,
warrantless inspections must be necessary for the regulatory scheme. 121 Finally, the
regulatory statute must provide notice that inspections may occur and limits on the
conduct of those inspections. 122 In applying the exception, the Court has emphasized
State Liquor Authority, 249 N.E.2d 440, 445)); LAFAVE, supra note 114, § 10.2(c) (rejecting
and condemning the conditional privilege theory).
117
See, e.g., Memorandum from Thomas L. Adams, Jr., Assistant Adm’r, to Reg’l
Adm’rs and Reg’l Counsels (June 5, 1987), available at http://www2.epa.gov/sites/product
ion/files/2013-09/documents/cont-access-mem.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/J5VSZEU6.
118
E.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 712–16 (1987) (upholding warrantless
search of vehicle dismantling businesses); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 593–94, 598–
99 (1981) (upholding inspections under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act and finding
that “[t]he greater latitude to conduct warrantless inspections of commercial property reflects
the fact that the expectation of privacy that the owner of commercial property enjoys in such
property differs significantly from the sanctity accorded an individual’s home, and that this
privacy interest may, in certain circumstances, be adequately protected by regulatory
schemes authorizing warrantless inspections”); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 317
(1972) (upholding warrantless search of gun dealer).
119
Donovan, 452 U.S. at 600.
120
Burger, 482 U.S. at 702–03.
121
Id.
122
Id.
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the business owner’s choice to enter a highly regulated industry—“when an
entrepreneur embarks upon such a [highly regulated] business, he has voluntarily
chosen to subject himself to a full arsenal of governmental regulation” 123 and “in
effect consents to the restrictions placed upon him.” 124 In United States v. Biswell, 125
for example, the court reasoned that “inspections for compliance with the Gun
Control Act pose only limited threats to the dealer’s justifiable expectations of
privacy” because “[w]hen a dealer chooses to engage in this pervasively regulated
business and to accept a federal license, he does so with the knowledge that his
business records, firearms, and ammunition will be subject to effective
inspection.” 126
Courts have relied on the pervasively regulated business exception to uphold
warrantless administrative searches under a variety of environmental statutes.127 In
State v. Bonaccurso, 128 for example, a New Jersey state court blessed warrantless
entry on the property of a commercial slaughterhouse by an inspector from the New
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) under both the open fields
exception and the closely regulated business exception. 129 The inspector witnessed
123

Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313 (1978) (“The element that
distinguishes these enterprises from ordinary businesses is a long tradition of close
government supervision, of which any person who chooses to enter such a business must
already be aware.”).
124
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 271 (1973).
125
406 U.S. 311 (1972).
126
Id. at 316.
127
See United States v. V-1 Oil Co., 63 F.3d 909, 912 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding
unannounced warrantless searches under the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act);
Balelo v. Baldrige, 724 F.2d 753, 755 (9th Cir. 1984) (upholding regulation requiring vessel
owners to consent to the placement of observers as a condition of obtaining a commercial
fishing permit under the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 pursuant to the closely
regulated industry exception); United States v. Kaiyo Maru No. 53, 699 F.2d 989, 995 (9th
Cir. 1983) (upholding warrantless inspections authorized by the Fishery Conservation and
Management Act);United States v. Raub, 637 F.2d 1205, 1211 (9th Cir. 1980) (adverting to
historical and pervasive regulation of the salmon-fishing industry to uphold a warrantless
boarding of a vessel to enforce Sockeye Salmon or Pink Salmon Fishing Act); Gulf of Me.
Trawlers v. United States, 674 F. Supp. 927, 932–33 (D. Me. 1987) (“The Magnuson Act
provides for warrantless searches of vessels reasonably believed to be in violation of the
provisions of the Act and for the seizure of fish therein, 16 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(1)(A), and the
reasonableness of these warrantless searches has been expressly upheld in prior cases.”);
United States v. Tsuda Maru, 470 F. Supp. 1223, 1228 (D. Alaska 1979) (applying Barlow’s
to uphold a warrantless search under the Fishery Conservation and Management Act); In re
Mullins & Pritchard, Inc., 549 So.2d 872, 876 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (upholding warrantless
administrative search of oil and gas production facility under Louisiana environmental
statute); State v. Bonaccurso, 545 A.2d 853, 857 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1988) (upholding
warrantless inspection under the New Jersey Water Pollution Control Act); Commonwealth
Dep’t of Envtl. Res. v. Blosenski Disposal Serv., 566 A.2d 845, 848–50 (Pa. 1989)
(upholding warrantless inspection under the Pennsylvania Solid Waste Management Act).
128
545 A.2d 853 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1988).
129
Id. at 857–58, 860.
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unpermitted discharges to water that violated the Water Pollution Control Act. 130
The court found that the right of entry granted to the NJDEP in the Water Pollution
Control Act was “constitutionally sufficient” because “[t]he State has enunciated a
substantial government interest and has enacted a legislative scheme in response
which attempts to alleviate the problem in a manner which is reasonable in its time,
place and manner.” 131 But the inquiry regarding the applicability of the closely
regulated business exception is specific to the statute and industry involved, and the
Supreme Court has limited the scope of the exception. In Marshall v. Barlow’s,
Inc., 132 the Court declined to permit the secretary of labor to invoke the exception to
permit warrantless inspections of business premises under section 8(a) of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act. 133 Notably, courts have since held that the
exception does not apply to some core environmental statutes, including the
CWA; 134 Barlow’s likely precludes, or at least casts significant doubt upon,
application of the closely regulated business exception under many environmental
statutes.
Even when a warrant must be obtained to conduct an administrative
(environmental) search, the showing required to obtain a warrant may be relaxed.
With respect to the showing required to obtain an administrative search warrant,
probable cause to support an administrative search “may be based not only on
specific evidence of an existing violation but also on a showing that ‘reasonable
legislative or administrative standards for conducting an . . . inspection are satisfied
with respect to a particular [establishment].’” 135 The agency need not show probable
cause of a specific statutory violation; it may be enough to demonstrate that the
inspection is part of a larger regulatory program. 136
130

Id. at 855.
Id. at 857.
132
436 U.S. 307 (1978).
133
Id. at 309.
134
E.g., United States v. Hajduk, 396 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1234 (D. Colo. 2005) (holding
that the closely regulated business exception did not apply to an electroplating company
regulated under the CWA and observing that the exception does not extend to “general
purpose environmental law applied to industrial companies”). See generally United States v.
Tarkowski, 248 F.3d 596, 599 (7th Cir. 2001) (observing “[t]hat such [CERCLA access]
orders must comply with the Fourth Amendment is apparent from Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc.
. . .”); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 39 Va. Cir. 353, 358 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1996) (“[R]egarding
fishing for striped bass, there is no regulatory scheme under Virginia law or regulations
which would allow the so-called administrative searches exception, permitting warrantless
inspections or searches of closely regulated industries.”).
135
Marshall, 436 U.S. at 320 (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538
(1967)).
136
Id. at 321 (“A warrant showing that a specific business has been chosen for an OSHA
search on the basis of a general administrative plan for the enforcement of the Act derived
from neutral sources such as, for example, dispersion of employees in various types of
industries across a given area, and the desired frequency of searches in any of the lesser
divisions of the area, would protect an employer’s Fourth Amendment rights.”). Some courts
considering challenges to warrants issued to enforce the CWA, however, have closely
131
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In Camara v. San Francisco, 137 a municipality sought entry to a private
residence to conduct a warrantless administrative inspection to identify possible
violations of the housing code; the resident refused entry and was arrested and
released on bail. 138 The Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment requires a
warrant based on probable cause to conduct such administrative inspections, but
observed that in some circumstances the warrant requirement could be satisfied in
the context of area code-enforcement inspections, observing that “because the
inspections are neither personal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of
crime, they involve a relatively limited invasion of the urban citizen’s privacy.” 139
The Court also noted that area code-enforcement inspections “have a long history of
judicial and public acceptance” and that “it is doubtful that any other canvassing
technique would achieve acceptable results.” 140 The government could thus obtain a
warrant to enter a residence by showing that “reasonable legislative or
administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect
to a particular dwelling” and need not “depend upon specific knowledge of the
condition of the particular dwelling.” 141 Standards might include “the passage of
time, the nature of the building (e.g., a multifamily apartment house), or the
condition of the entire area.” 142 Notably, the Camara standard has been applied to
evaluate warrants issued in support of administrative searches conducted pursuant
to environmental statutes. 143
Additionally, even when courts do not expressly invoke the relaxed Camara
standard, agency warrant applications are regularly upheld and the showing required
by courts readily satisfied. 144 Many agencies have adopted procedures for
examined whether the “allegations are sufficient to support a finding that there was probable
cause to believe the creek fell within the definition of ‘waters of the United States’ . . . .”
United States v. Evans, No. 3:05 CR 159 J 32HTS, 2006 WL 2221629, at *15–22 (M.D. Fla.
Aug. 2, 2006).
137
387 U.S. 523 (1967).
138
Id. at 526–28. The housing code was contained in a city ordinance and provided that
“employees of the City departments or City agencies, so far as may be necessary for the
performance of their duties, shall, upon presentation of proper credentials, have the right to
enter, at reasonable times, any building, structure, or premises in the City to perform any
duty imposed upon them by the Municipal Code.” Id. at 526.
139
Id. at 537.
140
Id.
141
Id. at 538.
142
Id.
143
See, e.g., In re Search Warrant, No. MISC.NO.04-00079-MPT, 2004 WL 1368848,
at *3 (D. Del. 2004) (invoking the Camara standard in upholding a search warrant issued
pursuant to the CWA).
144
E.g., Pub. Serv. Co. of Ind., Inc. v. EPA, 509 F. Supp. 720, 724 (S.D. Ind. 1981)
(upholding two warrants issued under the CAA, observing that allegations in the warrant
application that the facility had exceeded certain CAA standards were “clearly sufficient on
their face as a basis for issuance of an administrative inspection warrant,” and concluding
that “[a] warrant application need not be accompanied by actual documentation of alleged
past violations . . .”); Adams, supra note 117. But see Ohio v. Denune, 612 N.E.2d 768, 773–
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conducting administrative searches and the conduct of searches pursuant to these
procedures is rather routinized. 145
CERCLA’s access procedures provide an example. 146 CERCLA authorizes
entry to property for “determining the need for response, or choosing or taking any
response action under this subchapter, or otherwise enforcing the provisions of this
subchapter.” 147 Generally, an agency will request access, which is often
“voluntarily” granted—the statute authorizes fines of up to $25,000 per day if
property owners unreasonably deny access. 148 Recognizing that “threat of penalties
of this magnitude could obviously have a chilling effect on the landowner’s exercise
of his property rights” and that “the right of a landowner to refuse entry to his
property is clearly one of the civil rights protected by the Constitution,” courts have
developed standards for evaluating whether a landowner was reasonable in denying
access and for reviewing the assessment and amount of civil fines.149 The threat of
substantial fines nonetheless creates a strong incentive for property owners to grant
access when it is requested.
If a property owner declines to provide the EPA with access, the agency can
seek a judicial warrant, obtain an administrative order of entry, and then proceed to
federal district court in an enforcement proceeding to obtain compliance with that
order, 150 or it can proceed directly to federal district court to obtain an original court

77 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (finding that a warrant was required for an Ohio Environmental
Protection Agency search of a tractor-trailer parked in a salvage yard and that no probable
cause existed based on an anonymous phone tip that the tractor-trailer contained hazardous
substances and had been relocated to avoid inspection and independent observation of
barrels).
145
Notably, however, access accompanied by drilling wells and other physical
occupations associated with entry have been deemed takings in some circumstances. Roger
D. Schwenke, Regulatory Access to Contaminated Sites: Some New Twists to an Old Tale,
26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 749, 788–92 (2002) (reviewing cases); see also
Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364, 1375–78 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (finding installation of
groundwater monitoring wells gave rise to a taking).
146
Although CERCLA’s access procedures do not require application for a warrant,
they do require the agency to obtain a court order, which would likely be deemed the
“functional equivalent of a warrant” sufficient to satisfy the Fourth Amendment. Marshall v.
Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 325 n.23 (1987).
147
42 U.S.C. § 9604(e)(1) (2012). For a comprehensive overview of CERCLA site
access issues, see Schwenke, supra note 145, at 753 (“It would be perhaps an epitome of
understatement to suggest that this grant of entry authority is quite broad.”). For an example
of a state statute authorizing access see the access provisions of Michigan’s Environmental
Response Act. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.20117 (2011).
148
42 U.S.C. § 9604(e)(5)(B)(ii).
149
United States v. Taylor, 8 F.3d 1074, 1077 (6th Cir. 1993) (reviewing an assessment
of civil fines under the Michigan Environmental Response Act); see also United States v. M.
Genzale Plating, Inc., 807 F. Supp. 937 (E.D.N.Y.1992) (evaluating the imposition of fines
under CERCLA’s access provisions).
150
42 U.S.C. § 9604(e)(5)(A) to (B).
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order enjoining interference with an authorized request for entry. 151 Access is
warranted where the agency has “a reasonable basis to believe there may be a release
or threat of a release of a hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant,” 152 which
can be “established either by presenting specific evidence relating to the facility to
be entered or by demonstrating that the entry is part of a neutral administrative
inspection plan.” 153 Access may be granted to properties that are not the site of the
release, 154 including adjoining properties. 155 Courts have permitted access by
nonagency, private entities 156 and granted access to residential properties. 157 The
statute instructs that courts should not order access where “under the circumstances
of the case the demand for entry or inspection is arbitrary and capricious, an abuse
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 158
This standard is quite deferential to agencies. However, in United States v.
Tarkowski, 159 the Seventh Circuit found that the EPA abused its discretion, and
declined to grant the agency an access order, where the EPA sought access to private
property with little evidence of contamination and the order sought access to conduct
remediation in addition to access to investigate.160 Tarkowski presented unusual
facts. The property involved was the primary residence of an elderly man and was
located in an area that had developed and become more upscale. 161 The neighbors
regarded the property as an eyesore and complained about the property to the EPA,
and otherwise “harass[ed]” Tarkowski. 162 However, although the property was
cluttered and run down, prior testing had shown no pollution levels of concern. 163
While the Seventh Circuit remarked in its decision that it did “not know whether
Tarkowski’s angry neighbors exert a malign influence over the local office of the
151

United States v. Charles George Trucking Co., 682 F. Supp. 1260, 1266–70 (D.
Mass. 1988).
152
42 U.S.C. § 9604(e)(5)(B); see also N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Briar Lake Dev.
Corp., 736 F. Supp. 62, 66 (D.N.J. 1990) (holding that CERCLA’s statutory standard
displaces the usual equitable standard for obtaining an injunction).
153
Adams, supra note 117, at 8.
154
United States v. Fisher, 864 F.2d 434, 437 (7th Cir. 1988) (“The release (actual or
threatened) need not be on that property; the statute authorizes the EPA to enter any place
where entry is necessary to determine the need for response or the appropriate response, and
any place adjacent to such a place.”).
155
Id.; Charles George Trucking Co., 682 F. Supp. at 1273–74.
156
B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 697 F. Supp. 89, 93–97 (D. Conn. 1988) (upholding
access by private party generator who had entered into a consent decree with the EPA to
implement a remedy under § 9606(a)).
157
United States v. Mountaineer Refining Co., 886 F. Supp. 824, 826 (D. Wyo. 1995)
(granting access under section 104 to “residential property that includes about 40 acres and
contains [the] family home and garage” that was adjacent to the contaminated site).
158
42 U.S.C. § 9604(e)(5)(B)(i).
159
248 F.3d 596 (7th Cir. 2001).
160
Id. at 599–600.
161
Id. at 597–98.
162
Id. at 598.
163
Id.
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EPA,” the court was clearly doubtful that the property presented an environmental
threat and was suspect of the agency’s motives.164 Additionally, the fact that the EPA
sought access for both investigation and remediation proved to be important. The
Seventh Circuit focused on the dangers of authorizing the agency to undertake
unspecified remedial action 165 and expressly noted that it “need not consider
whether, if only [access for investigative purposes was] sought, the EPA has made
a sufficient showing to justify such an order.” 166
The foregoing overview reveals that agencies regularly conduct environment
surveillance to implement environmental statutes and illustrates how the Fourth
Amendment applies in that context. Often, this simply entails applying settled
Fourth Amendment doctrine, although some aspects of the environmental context
render certain Fourth Amendment doctrines particularly salient. For example, the
open fields doctrine and the closely regulated business exception are often
potentially available as a result of the nature of the conduct and entities being
regulated.
Ultimately, however, the Fourth Amendment cases flowing from
environmental surveillance are not particularly helpful for thinking about privacy
with respect to environmentally significant behaviors because they overwhelmingly
involve surveillance of commercial entities as opposed to individuals. This is
because most statutory environmental law does not apply to individuals. 167 Although
the warrant requirement for administrative searches clearly extends to commercial
entities, searches of commercial entities and private persons pose distinct privacy
considerations. 168 Thus, privacy vis-à-vis nuisance provides an unsatisfying basis
for comparison to privacy vis-à-vis environmentally significant individual behavior
because often actions giving rise to a nuisance do not need to be widely aggregated
164

Id. at 600.
Id. (“It is unreasonable for the EPA to insist on judicial carte blanche to embark on
drastic remedial action in advance of obtaining any rational basis for believing that there is
any danger to the environment that would warrant such action.”).
166
Id. at 598.
167
Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV, supra note 1, at 517–18.
168
Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 237 n.4 (1986) (upholding
warrantless aerial inspection of a commercial facility under the CAA but distinguishing a
search of the curtilage of a private home); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545–46 (1967)
(“We do not in any way imply that business premises may not reasonably be inspected in
many more situations than private homes. . . .”); N.J. Dept. Envtl. Prot. v. Huber, 63 A.3d
197, 211 (N.J. 2013) (declining to apply the closely regulated industry exception to wetlands
regulation on residential property, observing that “[t]he factual setting and historical
perspective to the exception for pervasively or closely regulated businesses noted in Burger
fail to provide support for a general extrapolation of Burger’s holding permitting a limited
area of warrantless administrative searches to the more heightened privacy interests that are
associated with a private, residential property,” and concluding that “Burger arose in a
commercial business setting and its emphasis on the lesser privacy interest in such settings,
particularly when highly regulated work is performed, does not encourage Burger’s
extension outside of the commercial setting of a closely regulated industry” (citing New York
v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 693–96, 702 (1987))).
165
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to impose environmental harms. And, similarly, most Fourth Amendment
environmental surveillance cases arising under environmental statutes provide an
unsatisfying basis for comparison because they involve commercial entities as
opposed to individuals. There is, however, a subset of Fourth Amendment
environmental surveillance cases that provide a better basis for insight into privacy
in environmentally significant individual behaviors because they involve both
aggregation and individuals—cases involving the application of fish and game laws
to individuals (or the “hunter enforcement” cases). 169
C. Hunter Enforcement Cases
Fish and game officers are often conferred broad statutory authority to
investigate and enforce fish and game laws, 170 including entering property, 171

169

This is not to suggest that the hunter enforcement cases provide a perfect analogue.
Although privacy balancing in the hunter enforcement cases provides a closer analogy to
privacy balancing with respect to the collection and use of information about
environmentally significant individual behaviors than nuisance or environmental statutes
directed to commercial entities, even the hunter enforcement cases present significant
distinctions. Fish and game stops of hunters to request identification and search a game bag
intrude on privacy in a qualitatively different way than the generation, storage, and use of
data about individuals’ everyday behaviors by smart cities.
170
I use the term “fish and game officers” and “fish and game laws” loosely to
encompass generally laws governing hunting and fishing and those charged with
implementing such laws.
171
E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1531.13 (2012) (“Any regularly employed salaried
wildlife officer may enter any private lands or waters if the wildlife officer has good cause
to believe and does believe that a law is being violated.”); id. § 1531.14 (“Any person
regularly employed by the division of wildlife for the purpose of conducting research and
investigation of game or fish or their habitat conditions . . . or in the enforcement of laws or
division rules relating to game or fish, . . . while in the normal, lawful, and peaceful pursuit
of such investigation, work, or enforcement may enter upon, cross over, be upon, and remain
upon privately owned lands for such purposes and shall not be subject to arrest for trespass
while so engaged or for such cause thereafter.”); see also State v. Coburn, 903 N.E.2d 1204,
1207 (Ohio 2009) (“This provision [RC 1531.14] is . . . clear and unambiguous; it plainly
permits wildlife officers to enter upon private land while in the normal, lawful, and peaceful
pursuit of enforcing laws relating to game and fish.”).
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conducting various types of searches, 172 and operating fish and game checkpoints. 173
There are hundreds of cases examining whether and how the Fourth Amendment
applies with respect to the enforcement of fish and game laws. 174 These cases may
172
E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 23:10-20, at 565–66 (2006) (“A member of the Fish and
Game Council and any conservation officer may, without warrant search and examine any
boat, conveyance, vehicle, fish box, fish basket, game bag, game coat or other receptacle for
game and fish, when he has reason to believe that a provision of this Title, or any law
supplementary thereto, or the State Fish and Game Code has been violated . . . . A court,
upon receiving proof of probable cause for believing in the concealment of a bird, animal or
fish so unlawfully caught, taken, killed, had in possession or under control, shipped or about
to be shipped, shall issue a search warrant and cause a search to be made in any place, and
to that end, may, after demand and refusal, cause any building, inclosure or car to be entered,
and any apartment, chest, box, locker, crate, basket or package to be broken open and its
contents examined by a member of the Fish and Game Council or any conservation officer.”);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1531.13 (“They may inspect any container or package at any time
except when within a building and the owner or person in charge of the building objects. The
inspection shall be only for bag limits of wild animals taken in open season or for wild
animals taken during the closed season, or for any kind or species of those wild animals. . . .
A wildlife officer . . . may search any place which the officer has good reason to believe
contains a wild animal or any part of a wild animal taken or had in possession contrary to
law . . . . If the owner or person in charge of the place to be searched refuses to permit the
search, upon filing an affidavit in accordance with law with a court having jurisdiction of the
offense and upon receiving a search warrant issued, the officer forcibly may search the place
described . . . .”); see also State v. Putzke, 218 N.E.2d 627, 629 (Ohio Ct. App. 1966)
(upholding warrantless search of fishing boat and observing that “[e]nforcement of the
Wildlife Laws without a search warrant, where the officer has reason to believe that evidence
of violation of such laws may be found . . . is consistent with the spirit and purpose of the
Ohio Wildlife Laws”). But see Washington Cnty. v. Althiser, No. 97CA14, 1998 WL 2514,
at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 6, 1998) (“We reiterate our prior warning. A wildlife officer, just
like any state actor, must have probable cause and either a warrant to search or the situation
must fit a recognized exception to the warrant requirement.”); State v. Hopkins, No. 94 CA
05, 1995 WL 34786, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 26, 1995) (observing that “[w]ildlife officers
are as much bound by constitutional limits as any other police officer” and equating the “has
good reason to believe” standard to probable cause).
173
“[A] roadblock, sometimes called a checkpoint, check station, or the like, is an
officially required stopping or slowing of the motor vehicles that pass a designated point on
a road, street, or highway in order to inspect or search the vehicles or to question the drivers
or other occupants.” Jeffery F. Ghent, Annotation, Validity of Roadblocks by State or Local
Officials for Purpose of Enforcing Fish or Game Laws, 87 A.L.R. 981, 982 n.1 (1991); e.g.,
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 36-1201(b) (2011) (providing statutory authority for fish and game
checkpoints); State v. Thurman, 996 P.2d 309, 315–16 (Idaho Ct. App. 1999) (upholding
fish and game checkpoint and listing cases); State v. Tourtillott, 618 P.2d 423, 427–30 (Or.
1980) (upholding, under both the state and federal constitutions, a state police roadblock
designed to enforce game laws); State v. Halverson, 277 N.W.2d 723, 724–25 (S.D. 1979)
(upholding stop of vehicles at a checkpoint for the purpose of checking wild game).
174
Numerous law review articles, primarily student notes, discuss the intersection
between the Fourth Amendment and hunter enforcement. See generally, e.g., Edwin J.
Butterfoss & Joseph L. Daly, State v. Colosimo: Minnesota Anglers’ Freedom From
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prove to be particularly helpful for generating insights into privacy vis-à-vis
environmentally significant individual behaviors because (1) the conduct regulated
by the fish and game laws is typically of a type that is relatively insignificant in
isolation (taking a single deer out of season) but potentially harmful when
aggregated with the conduct of others (wholesale poaching could, for example,
impact deer populations); (2) these cases usually involve individuals (hunters) as
opposed to commercial entities; and (3) the Fourth Amendment analysis in these
cases often involves an express balancing of privacy and state interest.
A review of hunter enforcement cases permits a few observations that may be
helpful for thinking about privacy with respect to environmentally significant
individual behaviors. In weighing privacy harms against state interest, the fact that
the hunter’s conduct would require aggregation to produce environmental harm does
not appear to diminish the weight afforded to the state interest. Indeed, the state
interest in enforcing fish and game laws is generally recognized to be significant.
Additionally, the fact that fish and game laws are directed primarily to individuals
as opposed to commercial entities plays out in an interesting fashion in the Fourth
Amendment analysis. On the one hand, privacy intrusions are clearly recognized to
be more significant with respect to individuals, and one mechanism that is employed
to justify intrusion on hunter privacy is to liken hunters to a regulated business. On
the other hand, the enforcement challenges presented by applying fish and game
laws to individuals provide strong rationales for justifying less protective practices
as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Finally, overall, hunter enforcement
appears to present a context where legislatures and courts balancing privacy and
enforcement have generally privileged enforcement, suggesting the twin facts—that
the privacy intrusions accrue to individuals and the conduct being regulated requires
aggregation to produce significant harm—do not dictate that privacy interests will
trump (environmental) regulatory interests.

Unreasonable Searches and Seizures Becomes “The One That Got Away,” 31 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 527 (2004); Donald C. Douglas, Jr., Comment, A Comment On Louisiana
Wildlife Agents and Probable Cause: Are Random Game Checks Constitutional?, 53 LA. L.
REV. 525 (1992); Giffin, supra note 20; Bryan M. Mull, Comment, The Hidden Cost of Rod
and Rifle: Why State Fish and Game Laws Must Be Amended in Order to Protect Against
Unreasonable Search and Seizure in the Great Outdoors, 42 U. BALT. L. REV. 801 (2013);
Karie A. Price, State v. Larsen: The Catch of the Day Is a Violation of Your Fourth
Amendment Protections Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 8 GREAT PLAINS
NAT. RESOURCES J. 78 (2003); Malin J. Stearns, Note, It’s Good to Be the Game Warden:
State v. Boyer and the Erosion of Privacy Protection for Montana Sportsmen, 65 MONT. L.
REV. 187 (2004); Scott Witty, It’s a Keeper: Preserving Minnesota’s Recreational Fishing
by Allowing Effective Regulatory Enforcement, 26 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 151 (2004).
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1. Aggregation
Fourth Amendment analysis can require courts to balance the state interest
advanced by a challenged practice and the privacy intrusion that it occasions. 175 The
hunter enforcement cases often engage in this type of balancing176 and routinely
identify a very strong government interest in enforcement of fish and game laws.
Importantly, the fact that many hunters’ actions must generally be aggregated to
produce the environmental harm sought to be avoided (depletion of fish and game
populations) does not appear to diminish the perceived state interest in the hunter
enforcement cases.
The Idaho Supreme Court, in evaluating a game checkpoint under the Fourth
Amendment, observed that “[t]he State has a compelling interest in the management
and conservation of its natural resources, including wildlife”; the court looked to the
broad statutory authority granted to fish and game wardens as a signal of the
“legislature’s perception that fish and game violations are matters of grave public
concern which justify minimal intrusion into the public’s right of privacy.” 177 En
route to holding that officers’ warrantless entry to property to enforce hunting law
was permitted under the open fields doctrine, a New Jersey court reasoned that
hunting is “a dangerous activity which subjects people and domestic animals to
possible injury”; the court concluded that “it would appear that there is strong public
interest in the enforcement of laws pertaining to the regulation and control of the
taking of wildlife in New Jersey . . . .” 178 These cases illustrate a common refrain in
hunter enforcement cases. As the Supreme Court of North Dakota summarized in a
175

E.g., Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 314 (1997) (“When . . . ‘special needs’—
concerns other than crime detection—are alleged in justification of a Fourth Amendment
intrusion, courts must undertake a context-specific inquiry, examining closely the competing
private and public interests advanced by the parties.”); Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523,
536–37 (1967) (setting forth a reasonableness balancing test for administrative searches and
observing that “[u]nfortunately, there can be no ready test for determining reasonableness
other than by balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search entails”).
176
E.g., State v. Jackson, 764 So.2d 64, 72 (La. 2000) (observing that “[i]n all cases
addressing the constitutionality of the checkpoints, the intrusion on the individual’s liberty
interest has been weighed against the legitimate governmental interest involved”); Jamie
Esser, The Validity of Warrantless Administrative Searches During Fishing Regulation
Enforcement, DCBA BRIEF, Feb. 2011, at 34, 39 (reviewing recreational fishing search cases
and concluding that “[t]he courts in many of the stated cases are balancing the needs of the
individual against the governmental interest”). Although it can be difficult to discern when
balancing is appropriate and the Supreme Court’s view has evolved—see generally Fabio
Arcila, Jr., Special Needs and Special Deference: Suspicionless Civil Searches in the Modern
Regulatory State, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1223, 1226–34 (2004) (describing balancing in
application of the special needs test)—for present purposes it is sufficient to note that many
courts have engaged in such balancing in hunter enforcement cases at different times and in
different contexts.
177
State v. Medley, 898 P.2d 1093, 1097 (Idaho 1995) (striking down a fish and game
checkpoint used as a drag net to identify myriad unrelated violations).
178
State v. Gates, 703 A.2d 696, 700 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1997).
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case upholding a fish and game checkpoint, “As precedents elsewhere have
recognized, the State has a compelling interest in managing and preserving its
wildlife.” 179 This articulation of state interest offered by the California Supreme
Court in 2011 in upholding a suspicionless vehicle stop by a fish and game officer
is particularly thorough:
Here, the state interest at issue is the state’s interest in protecting and
preserving the fish and game resources of the state for the benefit of all
of the public and for future generations. The legitimacy and importance
of this state interest are reflected in a number of provisions embodied in
the California Constitution in numerous statutory provisions and in many
judicial decisions rendered throughout our state’s history. Past cases have
described the state interest in preserving and managing its natural
resources, including its wildlife, as great and compelling and have
stressed that the state has an obligation and duty to exercise supervision
over such resources for the benefit of the public generally. Although
many of the prior California decisions, drawing upon the common law,
speak of the state’s “title” or “ownership” of the wild fish and animals
within its borders—a characterization that a number of United States
Supreme Court decisions have described as a legal fiction—all of the
pertinent decisions, including all of the federal decisions that have
addressed the state ownership of wildlife language, confirm the legitimate
and, indeed, vital nature of a state’s interest in protecting its natural
resources, including the wildlife within the state, from depletion and
potential unavailability for future generations. 180
The strength of the identified interest in the enforcement of fish and game laws
likely arises, in part, from the nature of the government’s relationship to wildlife.
Both the doctrine of public ownership and public trust doctrine, for example, under
which governments are understood to own wildlife and/or have the responsibility to
manage wildlife for the benefit of the public, have been cited in Fourth Amendment
cases evaluating the government’s interest in enforcing fish and game laws. 181 For
179
State v. Albaugh, 571 N.W.2d 345, 347–48 (N.D. 1997) (citations omitted); see also
Betchart v. Cal. State Dep’t of Fish &Game, 205 Cal. Rptr. 135, 138 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)
(observing that “[t]he entries by the wardens are for the purpose of regulating and managing
a state-owned resource”).
180
People v. Maikhio, 253 P.3d 247, 260–61 (Cal. 2011) (citations omitted).
181
See State v. McHugh, 630 So.2d 1259, 1265–67 (La. 1994) (citing to public trust
doctrine in upholding “suspicionless [hunting] license check stops”); State v. Boyer, 42 P.3d
771, 776 (Mont. 2002) (“In this capacity, game wardens are acting not only as law
enforcement officers, but as public trustees protecting and conserving Montana’s wildlife
and habitat for all of its citizens.”); State v. Halverson, 277 N.W.2d 723, 724 (S.D. 1979)
(upholding fish and game checkpoint and weighing the state interest involved, reasoning
both that “[w]ild animals in this state are the property of the state” and that “[t]he citizens of
this state have an interest in the management of wildlife so that it can be effectively
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present purposes, however, what is interesting about the characterization of the
government interest in the hunter enforcement cases is that the weight afforded to
the environmental goal does not appear to be diminished by the fact that the actions
subject to regulation must be aggregated to impose meaningful environmental harm.
The individuals to whom fish and game laws are applied are, independently, merely
de minimis contributors; even when they violate fish and game laws, individually
they impose no appreciable harm to larger conservation goals. Courts did not
minimize the state interest involved by reasoning that the harm imposed by an
individual hunter’s violation of the fish and game laws was slight. 182 The overall
conservation benefits of implementing fish and game laws writ large defined the
state interest.
That the need for aggregation does not diminish state interest is true of Fourth
Amendment analysis in other contexts. 183 However, it is especially useful to observe
that the need for aggregation does not diminish state interest in the hunter
enforcement cases because, like other environmentally significant individual
behaviors, these cases involve individuals as contributors to an environmental
problem.
2. Individual
That hunters are a class of regulated individuals, as opposed to commercial
entities, bears on Fourth Amendment analysis in the hunter enforcement cases in an
interesting fashion. With respect to evaluating the state interest involved, the
challenge of enforcing fish and game laws against numerous individuals,
particularly in light of the often expansive geography of hunting and fishing,
provides strong arguments that aggressive enforcement measures are necessary for
fish and game regulation to function effectively. However, the fact that these
enforcement measures will be directed to individuals, as opposed to commercial
entities, generally causes (or would typically cause) the ensuing intrusion to be

conserved.”) (citation omitted); John D. Echeverria & Julie Lurman, “Perfectly Astounding”
Public Rights: Wildlife Protection and the Takings Clause, 16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 331, 350
n.93 (2003) (exploring the legal implications of the doctrine of public ownership of wildlife
and observing that “the doctrine of public ownership of wildlife also has been invoked to
justify warrantless searches and seizures in conjunction with the enforcement of wildlife
laws”); Dale D. Goble, Symposium, Three Cases/Four Tales: Commons, Capture, the Public
Trust, and Property in Land, 35 ENVTL. L. 807, 851 n.219 (2005) (describing how State’s
public interest in wildlife impacts Fourth Amendment analysis).
182
Boyer, 42 P.3d at 777 (observing that an angler’s “claim that he had a legitimate
expectation of privacy in his catch as he enjoyed the peace and tranquility of the Missouri
River reeks of irony as his peaceful and tranquil poaching threatened the river’s resources
for future generations”).
183
William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH.
L. REV. 1016, 1032 (1995) (“The government’s ‘need’ argument in these typical regulatory
settings is not the need to engage in this particular search. Rather, the relevant government
interest is the interest in having the regulatory regime.”).
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weighted more heavily. Courts in hunter enforcement cases, however, particularly
those approving relaxed Fourth Amendment procedures, have often characterized
hunters as akin to commercial entities in various respects and reasoned that the
intrusion is therefore minimized when fish and game laws are applied to hunters.
As noted above, the enforcement challenges presented by regulating hunters, in
large part because they are numerous and geographically dispersed individuals, are
often referenced as a significant factor in evaluating the need for a particular fish
and game enforcement practice. The Oregon Supreme Court forcefully made this
point in State v. Tourtillot, 184 where the court cited to the following information in
upholding warrantless game checkpoint stops:
In 1977, 412,100 hunting licenses were sold in Oregon, which then
contained about 2.4 million people. Recreational hunting and fishing
licenses sold in Oregon in 1977 totaled 1,043,158. Over one-half of
Oregon’s 96,981 square miles is publicly owned. These statistics
highlight the task which faces game law enforcement personnel in
carrying out the wildlife policy of this state. The broad expanse of
territory in Oregon, much of which is virtually uninhabited, makes law
enforcement difficult. The checkpoint was established on the first
weekend of hunting season. It was placed on an isolated road where
hunting activity was to be expected. Thus, the method chosen would be
one of the most effective ones to meet its goals. 185
Courts in many other hunter enforcement cases have been similarly sympathetic to
the enforcement challenges posed by the regulation of hunters. 186 Indeed, Justice
Blackmun, in his concurrence in Delaware v. Prouse, 187 (which held that roving
vehicle stops for license and registration checks violate the Fourth Amendment)
stated,
I would not regard the present case as a precedent that throws any
constitutional shadow upon the necessarily somewhat individualized and
perhaps largely random examinations by game wardens in the
performance of their duties. In a situation of that type, it seems to me, the
184

618 P.2d 423 (Or. 1980).
Id. at 430 (citations omitted).
186
E.g., People v. Maikhio, 253 P.3d 247, 262 (Cal. 2011); State v. Gates, 703 A.2d
696, 701 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1997) (“The nature of hunting, involving as it does vast
expanses of undeveloped land, and the mobility of its participants on foot and by use of motor
vehicles make it an elusive activity, requiring immediate response when violations of the law
are suspected.”); State v. Albaugh, 571 N.W.2d 345, 348 (N.D. 1997) (“Game wardens
surely face a daunting task when attempting to enforce the game laws in a rural region like
North Dakota. In assessing the need for checkpoints to do so, courts have stressed the limited
manpower available to game officials, the vast and remote areas where hunting usually
occurs, and the difficulty in detecting game violations without suspicionless stops.”).
187
440 U.S. 648 (1979).
185
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Court’s balancing process, and the value factors under consideration,
would be quite different. 188
More generally, the challenges of enforcing broad regulatory schemes are
recognized as a rationale for relaxing Fourth Amendment requirements in other
contexts; 189 in endorsing area code-enforcement inspections in Camara, for
example, the Supreme Court recognized that regulatory enforcement realities were
appropriate to consider in assessing reasonableness. 190 Thus, at least for this purpose
(assessing state interest and need), the fact that hunters constitute a class of difficultto-regulate individuals clearly increases tolerance for privacy intrusions.
Generally speaking in Fourth Amendment analysis, however, it is clear that
privacy intrusions experienced by individuals are weighed more heavily than
intrusions experienced by commercial entities. 191 Thus, the intrusions experienced
by hunters should be weighed more heavily than similar intrusions borne by
commercial entities in the application of environmental laws directed primarily to
commercial entities. The hunter enforcement cases underscore the particular concern
reserved for privacy intrusions experienced by individuals, albeit in a somewhat
contradictory fashion. Some courts characterize intrusions experienced by hunters
as intrusions experienced by individuals and value the intrusions accordingly. Other
courts distinguish hunters, as a class, from individuals writ large and on that basis
diminish the intrusions experienced by hunters. 192
188

Id. at 664 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Arcila, supra note 176, at 1240 (“[I]t is clear that we have moved from a limited
government with a commensurately limited civil search power, to an expansive government
whose effectiveness calls for a Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that accommodates
suspicionless civil searches.”).
190
Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535−36 (1967) (reasoning that “[i]n
determining whether a particular inspection is reasonable—and thus in determining whether
there is probable cause to issue a warrant for that inspection—the need for the inspection
must be weighed in terms of these reasonable goals of code enforcement,” and observing
that “[t]here is unanimous agreement among those most familiar with this field that the only
effective way to seek universal compliance with the minimum standards required by
municipal codes is through routine periodic inspections of all structures”).
191
Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 237 n.4 (1986) (“We find it
important that this is not an area immediately adjacent to a private home, where privacy
expectations are most heightened.”); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598–99 (1981) (“The
greater latitude to conduct warrantless inspections of commercial property reflects the fact
that the expectation of privacy that the owner of commercial property enjoys in such property
differs significantly from the sanctity accorded an individual’s home, and that this privacy
interest may, in certain circumstances, be adequately protected by regulatory schemes
authorizing warrantless inspections.”); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545–46 (1967)
(“We do not in any way imply that business premises may not reasonably be inspected in
many more situations than private homes . . . .”).
192
In one interesting case, the Ninth Circuit held that a stop undertaken by a roving
patrol that was stopping all vehicles in a national park to check for possible game violations
violated the Fourth Amendment. The court assessed the expectation of privacy not of hunters,
189
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In State v. Larsen, 193 the Supreme Court of Minnesota declined to extend the
closely regulated business exception to a game warden’s search of a fish house. 194
The court viewed that line of cases as extending to “industries” in a “narrow field of
commercial activity” where enforcement of the regulation at issue involved “serious
personal safety concerns or felony level criminal conduct.” 195 The court found that
the fishing regulations were “no more pervasive or comprehensive than the state’s
traffic rules and regulations” and that traffic stops require reasonable suspicion to
conduct a stop. 196
The court in Tallman v. Department of Natural Resources 197 similarly drew a
sharp distinction between industry and individuals with respect to invocation of the
closely regulated business exception. 198 Tallman upheld a warrantless search of a
commercial fishing vessel pursuant to a Michigan law governing commercial
fishing. 199 In doing so, the Tallman court drew a distinction between commercial
and recreational entities. 200 In a prior case, State Conservation Department v.
Seaman, 201 the Michigan Supreme Court held that the warrantless search and seizure
of a moored vessel conducted under the state’s fish and game laws, authorizing
warrantless searches based on probable cause to believe that a violation of the state’s
fish and game laws had occurred, violated the Fourth Amendment. 202 Distinguishing
its case from Seaman, the Tallman court noted,
Seaman authorized searches for the purpose of enforcing regulations
regarding wild animals, wild birds, and fish against commercial and
recreational violators alike. The statute at issue in the cases presently
before the Court . . . applies only to those licensed by the state to harvest
the state’s fishery resources for personal profit. The fact that the statute
at issue here is exclusively applicable to commercial fishers is especially
relevant, because the DNR has raised a question of first impression not
touched upon in Seaman or in any other decision of this Court: the legality

but of individuals who visit national parks and expressly declined to apply the closely
regulated business exception, observing that “Congress established national parks in part to
preserve for people a setting for respite and reflection” such that “federal regulations
governing the use and management of the parks . . .” do not diminish expectations of privacy
in those visiting national parks. United States v. Munoz, 701 F.2d 1293, 1298 (9th Cir. 1983).
193
650 N.W.2d 144 (Minn. 2002).
194
Id. at 153.
195
Id.
196
Id.
197
365 N.W.2d 724 (Mich. 1984).
198
Id. at 726.
199
Id. at 746.
200
Id.
201
240 N.W.2d 206 (Mich. 1976).
202
Id. at 213.
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of a warrantless search of commercial premises for the purpose of
enforcing a pervasive regulatory scheme. 203
Later in its decision, the Tallman court again emphasized that the holding adopting
and applying the closely regulated business exception was limited to commercial
fishermen. Distinguishing a prior case that had struck down a requirement that
persons hunting, fishing, or trapping allow conservation officers to “inspect, count,
and examine” all wildlife, hunting, or fishing equipment in their possession as
violating the search and seizure provision of Michigan’s Constitution, the Tallman
court noted,
That case [People ex rel. Attorney General v. Lansing Municipal
Judge] 204 might prove apposite to the cases presently before this Court,
but for the crucial fact that the party accused of violating the state’s
conservation laws in that case took the state’s wildlife for pleasure rather
than for profit. Because we deal here with parties engaged in a
pervasively regulated commercial endeavor, Lansing Municipal Judge is
inapposite. We do not pass here on the question whether the DNR may
make warrantless searches, absent probable cause and exigent
circumstances, of the persons or property of recreational fishers for the
purpose of enforcing regulations which limit their activities. 205
In other hunter enforcement cases, courts have either expressly applied the
closely regulated business exception to hunters 206 or employed rationales similar to
those used to justify the closely regulated business exception (consent, privilege, and
notice) to characterize hunters as having lower expectations of privacy in the
relevant context. In Betchart v. California State Department of Fish and Game, 207
for example, a California state court relied on the closely regulated business
exception in upholding warrantless entry by Fish and Game personnel on private
property where game is present to enforce wild game regulations.208 The court found
that the property in question was agricultural and, under federal law, was an open
field to which the property owner did not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy. 209 However, the plaintiff based his claim on the warrant requirement of the
203

Tallman, 365 N.W.2d at 741.
42 N.W.2d 120 (Mich. 1950).
205
Tallman, 365 N.W.2d at 741.
206
In addition to the discussed cases, see, for example, Hamilton v. Myers, 281 F.3d
520, 532 (6th Cir. 2002), finding that “[e]veryone who participates in the privilege of hunting
has a duty to permit inspections to determine whether they are complying with applicable
laws. Hunting and fishing are regulated activities under both state and federal law. The
Supreme Court has found that a warrantless search of a regulated industry or business is
reasonable.” Id. (citing New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987)).
207
205 Cal. Rptr. 135 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
208
Id. at 137–39.
209
Id. at 137.
204
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California Constitution, which applies a balancing test to open fields—whether a
person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that
expectation has been violated by unreasonable governmental intrusion. 210 The court
reasoned that “[t]he fact that Biswell dealt with a business is not the sole factor to be
considered” and observed that—by analogizing hunters to closely regulated
businesses—“[h]unters are required to be licensed,” and “[b]y choosing to engage
in this highly regulated activity, there is a fundamental premise that there is an
implied consent to effective supervision and inspection as directed by statute.” 211
Similarly, in People v. Maikho, 212 the California Supreme Court reasoned that
“the intrusion upon privacy engendered by a game warden’s stop of an angler or
hunter to demand the display of his or her catch or take is relatively minor,” in part
because hunters “have voluntarily chosen to engage in an activity that is heavily
regulated in order to assure the continued existence of the wildlife of this state for
the benefit not only of future generations but for the benefit of current anglers and
hunters themselves.” 213 The court went on to reject the idea that the rationales for
the closely regulated business exception might not apply to hunters as individuals,
commenting that “[c]ontrary to defendant’s contention, numerous cases establish
that the existence of pervasive regulation can diminish the reasonable expectation of
individuals as well as businesses.” 214
Still, in other hunter enforcement cases, while not relying expressly upon the
closely regulated business exception, courts have endeavored to distinguish hunters
as a class from the public writ large, citing to factors such as consent, privilege, and
notice or knowledge. In State v. Boyer, 215 for example, the Supreme Court of
Montana held that a game warden’s request for inspection of catch was not a search
because the fisherman had no expectation of privacy that society was prepared to
honor in the fishing catch contained in a closed live well. 216 The court found that
anglers were on notice of the inspection requirements (“[i]n complying with the well
established license requirements, anglers acknowledge the prospect of at least some
governmental intrusion into their activities”) and that by “engaging in this highly
regulated activity, anglers must assume the burdens of the sport as well as its
benefits.” 217 In People v. Layton, 218 an Illinois appellate court upheld the warrantless
search of a hunter’s game bag and held that “probable cause to search[] arises from
indicia that the person in question is a hunter, immediately or very recently engaged
in hunting.” 219 The court rejected application of the exigent circumstances or closely
regulated business exceptions on the grounds that the present search was not an
210
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administrative search. 220 The court instead reasoned that hunting “is a privilege, not
a right” and is “highly regulated” such that hunters “may be deemed [to] consent to
some intrusions”; the court ultimately characterized hunting as “an exception
because of necessity.” 221 Other courts have offered similar rationales for
distinguishing hunters as a class. 222
3. Balancing
Regardless of the specific rationales employed, the hunter enforcement cases
as a whole reveal that, overall, both the statutory grants of authority to fish and game
officers and the scrutiny of the actions of fish and game officers implementing those
statutes under the Fourth Amendment tend to strike a balance between enforcement
and privacy that favors enforcement. Fish and game checkpoints are regularly
upheld; 223 suspicionless stops have likewise occasionally received court approval. 224
As described by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, in a case upholding a warden’s
suspicionless stop of an ATV rider, “We, along with courts in other states, have also
recognized the limitations of the Fourth Amendment’s reach regarding wardens and
other officers whose duties include patrolling and protecting vast territories, such as
waterways and wooded areas.” 225 One commentator observed that “[s]tate statutes
granting to wildlife officers the authority to make warrantless searches have usually
220
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been upheld, whether they permitted warrantless searches by patrolling officers, at
fixed checkpoints, or business premises of commercial enterprises.” 226 Another
commentator criticized courts’ willingness to authorize game violation inspections,
observing that “allowing game wardens to make random stops would give rise to the
‘grave danger of abuse of discretion’ about which the Court in Prouse was rightly
concerned . . . .” 227 As noted above, the Supreme Court characterized the
implementation of fish and game law as an area appropriately afforded special
solicitude in Fourth Amendment analysis when Justice Blackmun referred in his
concurrence in Delaware v. Prouse to “the necessarily somewhat individualized and
perhaps largely random examinations by game wardens in the performance of their
duties.” 228 In 2000, the Supreme Court of Louisiana, en route to adopting a new
standard for evaluating checkpoints, lamented that its precedents (upholding hunting
license checkpoints but not checkpoints directed to drunk driving) “create the
anomaly that preservation of the state's wildlife is a more compelling governmental
interest than the protection of human life from drunken drivers on our public
roadways.” 229 Although the Supreme Court of Louisiana went on to rectify the
“anomaly” by adopting a new standard for evaluating checkpoints, the fact that the
anomaly existed at all attests to the solicitude afforded to fish and game enforcement.
This should not be taken to suggest that courts do not use the Fourth
Amendment to limit fish and game enforcement authority; there are numerous
examples of courts construing fish and game statutes narrowly to avoid
constitutional problems, striking down those statutes as inconsistent with Fourth
Amendment requirements or holding more narrowly that a particular search or
seizure violated the Fourth Amendment. 230 Overall, however, legislatures and
courts, while recognizing privacy concerns, have tended to strike a balance relatively
favorable to regulation in the hunter enforcement context.
226
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III. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Article is not to anticipate whether or how the Fourth
Amendment might apply to specific efforts to collect information about
environmentally significant individual behaviors. The purpose is to discern the
considerations that have proven salient in balancing environmental regulation and
privacy to date that may likewise be relevant to navigating privacy concerns that
arise with respect to policy directed to environmentally significant individual
behaviors.
In this regard, the Article’s survey suggests that neither the fact that
environmentally significant individual behaviors must be aggregated to produce
environmental harm nor the fact that individuals, as opposed to commercial entities,
experience the privacy intrusions involved dictates that privacy concerns will
override the needs of regulation. As evidenced by nuisance law, that individuals
impose an environmental externality can be a strong basis for minimizing privacy
interests. As evidenced by the hunter enforcement cases, even where aggregation is
required and individuals are the subject of regulation, privacy balancing can favor
regulation. Notably, however, the articulation of state interest in the hunter
enforcement cases is clear and strong. Those contemplating, crafting, and
implementing policies addressed to environmentally significant individual
behaviors should take care to articulate the strongest case possible that the
information sought furthers an important state interest. Privacy concerns need not
derail the development of sophisticated policies aimed at reducing harms arising
from environmentally significant individual behaviors, but a concerted effort will be
required to demonstrate the environmental value of limiting harms from
environmentally significant individual behaviors. A concerted effort will also be
required to demonstrate that information about environmentally significant
individual behaviors is important to effect policies directed to those behaviors and
that privacy balancing should therefore favor disclosure to enable regulation.

